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INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most infamous of attack advertisements, titled “Peace, 
Little Girl,” depicted a little girl in a field plucking petals from a daisy 
as she counted up from one to nine.1  At the end of her count, a man’s 
voice began counting down from ten.2  Upon reaching zero, an atomic 
bomb exploded.3  As the mushroom cloud appeared on the television 
screen, the voice of then-President Johnson stated: “These are the 
stakes—to make a world in which all of God’s children can live, or go 
into the dark.  We must either love each other, or we must die.”4  The 
ad was intended to attack statements that Barry Goldwater, the 
Republican presidential candidate, had made regarding nuclear 
warfare.5  Although the ad aired only once, it is credited with ushering 
in a new era of American politics.6  However, attack ads are nothing 
new—neither are anonymous ones. 
 
 1. ROBERT MANN, DAISY PETALS AND MUSHROOM CLOUDS: LBJ, BARRY 
GOLDWATER, AND THE AD THAT CHANGED AMERICAN POLITICS 55 (2011). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 56. 
 6. Id. at 109–12. 
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In 1800, President John Adams faced reelection against Thomas 
Jefferson.7  The Alien and Sedition Act prevented anyone from 
openly criticizing the President, so Jefferson sought other ways to get 
his message out.8  Jefferson anonymously distributed campaign 
propaganda9 and financially supported James Callender while 
encouraging him to publish a series of essays in the Richmond 
Examiner that attacked Adams, referring to him as a “hideous 
hermaphroditical character which has neither the force or firmness of 
a man, nor the gentleness and sensibility of a woman.”10  Adams 
fought back, calling Jefferson “a mean-spirited, low-lived fellow, the 
son of a half-breed Indian squaw, sired by a Virginia mulatto 
father.”11 
Today, negative campaign advertisements dominate the airwaves 
during election cycles.12  Just as Americans have come to expect to see 
more holiday-themed advertisements in November and December,13 
they too have come to expect a flood of negative campaign ads in the 
months preceding elections.14  In 2012, Americans witnessed the most 
expensive election campaign in history, topping off at approximately 
seven billion dollars.15  Modern attack ads, produced by strategy 
teams including behavioral scientists,16 are noticeably less overt, 
although no less persuasive, than they were in the nineteenth 
century.17  Rather than employ traditional name calling, modern 
 
 7. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 536 (2001). 
 8. Id. at 536. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 536–37. 
 11. Then & Now: Running for President, PBS, 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/then-and-now/presidents (last 
visited May 1, 2013). 
 12. Albert R. Hunt, Media Share Blame for Negative Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/us/15iht-letter15.html.  In 2012, “80 percent 
of [advertisements] put out by President Barack Obama and 84 percent of those by 
Mitt Romney” were negative. Id.  Over 90% of advertisements by outside groups 
were negative. Id. 
 13. Stuart Elliott, Calendar Says October; Retailers Say It’s Christmas, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2012, at B3. 
 14. Pauline Arrillaga, Election 2012: Negativity Dominates Campaign Cycle, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/ 
10/21/election-2012-negativity_n_1998436.html. 
 15. Audio recording: Open Meeting of the Federal Election Commission (Jan. 31, 
2013) (statement of Ellen Weintraub, Chair, of the FEC), available at 
http://www.fec.gov/audio/2013/2013013101.mp3. 
 16. Benedict Carey, Academic ‘Dream Team’ Helped Obama’s Effort, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2012, at D1. 
 17. See Hunt, supra note 12. 
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attack ads use subliminal messaging18 and sympathetic personal 
stories to paint negative pictures of political candidates.19 
In 2012, an advertisement produced by Priorities USA Action used 
the personal story of Joe Soptic.20  In the ad, Soptic described how he 
lost his job and health insurance plan when Governor Romney 
decided to close the plant where Soptic worked.21  Soptic’s wife later 
became ill but did not tell him until he brought her to the hospital and 
they discovered that it was too late to save her.  “I don’t know how 
long she was sick and I think maybe she didn’t say anything because 
she knew that we couldn’t afford the insurance,” Soptic lamented.22  
The ad ended with Soptic stating: “I do not think Mitt Romney 
realizes what he’s done to anyone, and furthermore I do not think 
[that he] is concerned.”23  The ad was widely criticized as tying 
Governor Romney to cancer.24  Nevertheless, Priorities USA Action 
defended the ad, calling it “wildly successful.”25  President Obama 
responded in a news conference, stating: “I don’t think that Governor 
Romney is somehow responsible for the death of the woman that was 
portrayed in that ad.  But keep in mind this is an ad that I didn’t 
approve.”26 
Priorities USA Action is a Super PAC,27 which means that it does 
not contribute to or coordinate with federal candidates and can 
receive unlimited contributions from individuals, corporations, and 
 
 18. See generally TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, 
IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY (2001) (studying the use of 
implicit racial appeals in political campaigns). 
 19. See Arrillaga, supra note 14. 
 20. Rachel Weiner, Priorities Ad Ties Mitt Romney to Cancer Death, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 7, 2012, 8:16 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/post/priorities-ad-ties-mitt-romney-to-cancer-death/2012/08/07/d723d8c0-e084-
11e1-8fc5-a7dcf1fc161d_blog.html. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Sabrina Siddiqui, Priorities USA Action Defends Controversial Romney Ad 
As ‘Wildly Successful’, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2012, 2:48 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/08/priorities-usa-action-romney-
ad_n_1756972.html. 
 26. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks to the White House 
Press Corps (Aug. 20, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps. 
 27. See Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/ 
superpacs.php?cycle=2012 (last updated Apr. 11, 2013). 
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labor unions.28  Given that Super PACs are subject to extensive 
disclosure requirements under the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(“FECA”), one would think that it would be easy to determine who 
funds  Priorities USA Action’s ads, but that is not always the case.  
Some of the information disclosed on Priorities USA Action’s 
itemized receipts clearly identifies the source of contributions, but 
some information does not.29  For example, in 2011, Priorities USA 
Action received $215,234.42 in contributions from Priorities USA, a 
501(c)(4) non-profit organization that is not required to disclose the 
source of its contributions when it contributes that money to a Super 
PAC.30 
To date, the identities of the contributors of nearly 30% of money 
spent in 2012 by outside organizations on campaign-related activity 
subject to disclosure remain undisclosed.31  That figure was higher in 
2010, at 44%.32  These statistics stand in stark contrast to prior election 
years, where undisclosed spending averaged less than 5% and never 
exceeded 13.3%.33  As undisclosed or “dark” money makes up a 
greater portion of overall spending, the influence of anonymous 
donors increases, and, accordingly, the public interest in knowing the 
sources of contributions becomes more imperative.34 
Some commentators point to the recent rise in undisclosed 
spending as evidence that the interest in avoiding disclosure is both 
strong and prevalent.35  They also point to statistics showing that 
 
 28. See Coordinated Communications and Independent Expenditures, FED. 
ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/indexp.shtml (last 
updated Jan. 2013); Independent Expenditure-Only Committees, FED. ELECTION 
COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/press/press2011/ieoc_alpha.shtml (last updated May 
20, 2013); see also infra Part II.A.1. 
 29. See Priorities USA Action, Report of Receipts and Disbursements (FEC 
Form 3X) at 5 (Dec. 6, 2012), available at http://images.nictusa.com/ 
pdf/812/12963769812/12963769812.pdf. 
 30. See id. at 21. 
 31. See Outside Spending by Disclosure, Excluding Party Committees, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/disclosure.php (last 
visited May 1, 2012). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  The statistics are based on data provided for the nine federal elections 
that preceded 2008. Id. 
 34. See Kim Barker, In Montana, Dark Money Helped Democrats Hold a Key 
Senate Seat, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 27, 2012, 11:40 AM), http://www.propublica.org/ 
article/in-montana-dark-money-helped-democrats-hold-a-key-senate-seat. 
 35. See Paul Blumenthal, ‘Dark Money’ In 2012 Election Tops $400 Million, 10 
Candidates Outspent by Groups with Undisclosed Donors, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 
2, 2012, 1:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/02/dark-money-2012-
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when disclosure requirements change, campaign spending shifts to 
those activities that are subject to less or no disclosure.36  They argue 
that individuals and groups that are determined to remain anonymous 
will choose to redirect their spending, even where the alternatives are 
more costly, rather than subject themselves to disclosure.37 
For over a century, Congress has recognized the need for campaign 
finance reform.  Congress first addressed this need in 1907 when it 
passed a law banning corporations and national banks from making 
contributions in connection with political elections.38  Over the course 
of the next forty years, Congress passed additional legislation that, 
among other things, barred unions and corporations from making 
independent expenditures, established contribution and spending 
limits, and required disclosure of certain contributions and 
expenditures.39  In 1971, these laws were consolidated into the 
“”FECA.40  Congress has amended the FECA several times since its 
 
election-400-million_n_2065689.html; see also Lee Drutman, Latest Dark Money 
Tallies: $213 Million in the General Election and Counting, 81% on Behalf of 
Republicans; 34 Races with $1 Million or More, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Nov. 2, 2012, 7:20 
AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/11/02/dark-money-tallies/. 
 36. See Julius Chen, Electioneering Communications Start to Reemerge After 
D.C. Circuit’s Van Hollen Ruling, INSIDE POL. L. (Oct. 1, 2012), 
http://www.insidepoliticallaw.com/2012/10/01/electioneering-communications-start-
to-reemerge-after-d-c-circuits-van-hollen-ruling; Alex Engler, Dark Money 
Organizations Change Strategies to Keep Donors Secret, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Sept. 
25, 2012, 1:56 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/09/25/dark-money-
organizations-change-strategies-to-keep-donors-secret/; Kevin Glandon, 
“Electioneering Communications” Virtually Vanish in Wake of Van Hollen 
Decision, INSIDE POL. L. (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.insidepoliticallaw.com/ 
2012/09/12/electioneering-communications-virtually-vanish-in-wake-of-van-hollen-
decision/; Robert Maguire, What Citizens United (et al) Wrought: The Shadow 
Money Explosion, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 18, 2012, 12:53 PM), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/09/what-citizens-united-et-al-wrought.html. 
 37. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign 
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708, 1737 (1999); Anthony Johnstone, A 
Madisonian Case for Disclosure 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 413, 416 (2012); Geoffrey 
A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of 
Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 485–86 (2007); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. 
Wis. Right to Life (Wisconsin II), 551 U.S. 449, 515, 517 n.10 (2007) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (noting how the hydraulics of political money and the “‘ingenuity and 
resourcefulness’ of political financiers revealed the massive regulatory gap left by 
[Buckley’s] ‘magic words’ test,” and ultimately lead to an “explosive growth of 
campaign-based advocacy, without even disclosure of its activities and funding 
sources”). 
 38. See FEC, THIRTY YEAR REPORT 3 (2005). 
 39. See id. at 3–4. 
 40. See id. at 4. 
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enactment, twice passing sweeping legislation that promised increased 
disclosure.41 
The actions and inactions of the executive and judicial branches of 
the federal government, however, have undermined Congress’s 
intentions and contributed to the recent rise in dark money.  The 
decisions of the Supreme Court’ and the rules promulgated by the 
Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) have inadvertently created 
easily exploitable loopholes in the FECA’s disclosure provisions.42  
The FEC Commissioners are divided evenly over the proper scope of 
the agency’s authority and the permissible interpretation of several 
provisions of the FECA and corresponding regulations.43  These splits 
have prevented the agency from promulgating any substantive rules 
since Citizens United v. FEC44 and from taking action against any 
conduct that falls beyond the scope of the FECA, as three 
Commissioners have narrowly interpreted it.  This narrow reading 
essentially creates a bright-line test that provides organizations with a 
manual for evading disclosure requirements. 
Thus far, attempts to reduce deadlocks within the FEC and to 
eliminate some of the adverse and unintended effects of some of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions have failed.  In 2008, then-candidate 
Obama promised to appoint new FEC commissioners.  Since taking 
office, however, President Obama has made only one unsuccessful 
attempt.45  Responding to the President’s call for increased 
 
 41. See id. at 5, 7 (discussing the 1974 Amendments to the FECA and the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002). 
 42. See generally infra Part II.A.2. 
 43. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 44. See Trevor Potter, President, Campaign Legal Ctr., Address to the Annual 




releases&Itemid=61 (discussing the FEC’s failure to garner the four votes necessary 
to put out a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking revising regulations since Citizens 
United). 
 45. See Editorial, That Campaign Promise About Campaigning, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/opinion/sunday/that-campaign-promise-
about-campaigning.html; Reforming the Federal Election Commission, CITIZENS FOR 
RESP. & ETHICS WASH., http://www.citizensforethics.org/policy/entry/reforming-the-
fec (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).  After a fifteen-month delay on a vote for Senate 
approval, President Obama’s nominee withdrew his nomination citing a “broken 
system.” Josh Isreal & Aaron Mehta, Withdrawn FEC Nominee Laments “Broken” 
Confirmation Process, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/10/07/2450/withdrawn-fec-nominee-laments-
broken-confirmation-process. 
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disclosure,46 members of Congress twice brought bills to the floor 
promising just that.47  Both bills, however, were ultimately defeated 
by filibuster after failing to garner the sixty votes necessary to invoke 
cloture.48  Although President Obama expressed dissatisfaction with 
the defeat of the more recent bill49 and recent polls show that the vast 
majority of Americans support disclosure of the source of 
contributions to outside groups,50 the President has yet to call upon 
Congress to continue its efforts to pass legislation increasing 
disclosure.51 
In the meantime, several state legislatures have adopted legislation 
that would avoid creating the kinds of loopholes that are currently 
apparent in the federal campaign laws.  The constitutionality of these 
laws, however, has been vigorously challenged in the courts.52  In 
determining the validity of these laws which, like the federal laws, are 
densely filled with campaign finance jargon incomprehensible to 
laypersons,53 lower courts must grapple with a series of precedential 
opinions that are “baffling[,] conflicted,”54 “unnecessarily 
incoherent,” and which too frequently provide inadequate guidance 
as to when compelled disclosure that goes beyond what the Supreme 
Court has specifically upheld as permissible.55  Without clear 
 
 46. See State of the Union Address, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 8 (Jan. 27, 
2010). 
 47. See Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections 
Act of 2012, S. 3369, 112th Cong. (2011); Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting 
Light on Spending in Elections Act of 2010, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 48. See S. Res. 5007, 112th Cong. (2012), 158 CONG. REC. S5008 (daily ed. July 16, 
2012) (roll call vote on motion to proceed); S. Res. 7383, 111th Cong. (2010), 156 
CONG. REC. S7388 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2010) (same). 
 49. See President Barack Obama, Statement on Senate Action on Campaign 
Finance Legislation, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (July 16, 2012). 
 50. Memorandum from Stan Greenberg et al., Democracy Corps, to Friends of 
Democracy Corps et al. (Nov. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.democracycorps.com/attachments/article/930/dcor.pcaf.postelect.memo.1
11312.final.pdf (based on a survey finding that eighty-seven percent of Americans 
who voted for Democrats and eighty-three percent of Americans who voted for 
Republicans in the 2012 general election supported increased disclosure of spending 
by outside groups). 
 51. See generally State of the Union Address, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1–13 
(Feb. 12, 2013). 
 52. See generally infra Part III. 
 53. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 471–72 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
 54. Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 355 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 55. See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 581, 622–23 (2011); Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The 
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guidance, some courts have opted to take a precautionary approach, 
erring on the side of free speech,56 while other courts have upheld 
equivalent laws, noting the importance of the government interest in 
providing the public with adequate disclosure.57  The Supreme Court 
has yet to clarify the permissible bounds of compelled disclosure.58 
This Note consists of four parts.  Part I examines the two 
competing interests that are at the center of this debate—free speech 
rights and the government’s interest in disclosure—and the 
development of campaign finance jurisprudence over the past half-
century.  Part II explores the current federal disclosure requirements, 
their inadequacies, and the ongoing debate among the FEC 
Commissioners over the proper interpretation of the FECA’s 
disclosure requirements.  Part III focuses on states’ attempts to 
increase disclosure for local elections beyond the federal 
requirements and evaluates the divergent approaches taken by courts 
in applying Supreme Court precedent and the exacting scrutiny 
standard of review.  Part IV proposes changes that can and should be 
made by all branches of government to increase disclosure.  Part IV 
argues that in order to close the loopholes in the federal 
requirements, Congress should do away with the major purpose test, 
and the FEC should employ multi-factor tests to determine which 
communications are express advocacy and electioneering 
communications.  Part IV further argues that the heightened 
specificity of review standard for laws banning speech should not 
apply to mere disclosure laws, and that courts should be particularly 
 
Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 1064, 1108–09 (2008); Richard L. Hasen, The Newer Incoherence: Competition, 
Social Science, and Balancing in Campaign Finance Law After Randall v. Sorrell, 68 
OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 849–50 (2007); Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live 
Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 56–57 (2004); see also Ctr. for Individual 
Freedom v. Tennant, 849 F. Supp. 2d 659, 687 n.25 (2011), rev’d on other grounds, 
706 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the Supreme Court and Courts of 
Appeals have issued “fractured and somewhat obscure opinions” in the area of 
election-related laws). 
 56. See Tennant, 849 F.2d at 687 n.25 (describing the “significant analytical 
struggle” undertaken in order to determine the validity of the state law). 
 57. For a discussion of cases upholding state disclosure laws, see generally infra 
Part II.B. 
 58. See, e.g., Real Truth About Abortion v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544, 
550 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 841 (2013) (mem.).  This is the most 
recent case addressing the constitutionality of disclosure laws in which the Supreme 
Court has denied a writ of certiorari. 
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deferential to state legislative attempts to reign in undisclosed 
spending in light of the special interests that are involved. 
I.  BACKGROUND: FREE SPEECH RIGHTS AND COMPELLED 
DISCLOSURE 
A. Free Speech Rights 
1. The Origins of and Justifications for Free Speech Rights 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”59  Enacted as part of the 
Bill of Rights, the primary purpose of the freedom of speech clause 
“was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, including 
discussion of candidates.”60  The First Amendment was added to the 
Constitution, in part, to create a counterbalance to the immunities 
provided to Congress in the Speech or Debate Clause.61  For election 
debates to be equal, the ratifiers believed that the people needed to 
enjoy the same freedoms as Congress when discussing the merits of 
candidates.62  Thus, the First Amendment served not only to protect 
the rights of unpopular minorities against a hostile majority, but also 
to protect the “rights of popular majorities . . . against a possibly 
unrepresentative and self-interested Congress.”63 
A few years after the Constitution was ratified, Congress enacted 
the Alien and Sedition Act (“Sedition Act”),64 limiting some of the 
broad protections that the First Amendment guaranteed.65  Although 
 
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 60. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828 
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 102–03 
(2005). 
 62. Id. at 104. 
 63. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
21 (1998). 
 64. The Alien and Sedition Act “made it a crime, punishable by a $5,000 fine and 
five years in prison, ‘if any person shall write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, 
scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United 
States, or either house of the Congress . . . or the President . . . with intent to defame 
. . . or to bring them . . . into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them . . . the 
hatred of the good people of the United States.’” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 273–74 (1964) (quoting Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596). 
 65. AMAR, supra note 61, at 103.  James Callender, who had attacked President 
Adams in a series of essays, was one of the individuals tried and convicted under the 
Act. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 70 (1895). 
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the Sedition Act significantly curtailed free speech rights, it did 
protect one area of speech—the truth.66  Nevertheless, it was found to 
be unconstitutional.67 
The current understanding of the First Amendment is that it 
provides the people with the right to openly criticize public officials 
unless a public official can prove that the statement was made “with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard, whether it was 
false or not.”68  This high bar protects the people’s right to “freely 
examin[e] public characters and measures,”69 including those who 
produce negative campaign ads. 
Political speech made during election campaigns is considered to 
be at the very core of the First Amendment.70  Political speech is not 
limited to speech per se.  Rather, it includes expressive conduct, such 
as wearing armbands to protest a war,71 desecrating a flag,72 and 
spending money on political speech.73  There are four primary 
justifications for protecting free speech.74  First, free speech promotes 
self-governance by allowing an open discussion of candidates.75  
Second, free speech aids the public in discovering the truth by 
facilitating a marketplace of ideas.76  Third, free speech advances 
autonomy by protecting self-expression.77  Finally, free speech 
promotes tolerance by protecting unpopular or distasteful speech.78  
Protecting speech can also serve as a way to protect other 
constitutional rights, such as the right to freedom of association, 
 
 66. AMAR, supra note 61, at 104. 
 67. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 274 (1964). 
 68. Id. at 279–80. 
 69. Id. at 274 (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 553–
54 (1876)). 
 70. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310, 339–40 (2010) 
(“The First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech 
uttered during a campaign for political office.’” (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic 
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per 
curiam) (“Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates 
are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our 
Constitution.”). 
 71. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 72. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313 (1990). 
 73. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 
 74. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
926 (Vicky Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 927–29. 
 77. Id. at 929. 
 78. See id. at 930. 
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which includes the right to pool money through contributions, and the 
right to privacy.79 
Because free speech is considered to be so crucial in ensuring a 
healthy, functioning democracy, laws restricting speech are generally 
upheld only if they can survive strict scrutiny and, as a result, must be 
narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest.80  The 
Supreme Court has recognized, however, that there are 
countervailing and often competing interests that justify regulating 
political speech.81  In light of these competing interests, the Court has 
created a two-tiered system of review for laws restricting political 
speech.82  Laws that suppress speech—laws that, for example, limit the 
amount that individuals, corporations, or other organizations can 
spend on political speech—are reviewed under strict scrutiny.83  Laws 
that burden speech, but that do not prevent anyone from speaking, 
such as laws that impose disclosure requirements on those that spend 
money on political speech, are subject to exacting scrutiny, which 
requires that they must be “substantially related” to a “sufficiently 
important” governmental interest.84 
2. Common Challenges to Laws Regulating Election-Related 
Speech 
The three most common challenges to laws restricting political 
speech are that they are overly broad, vague, or directly violative of 
the First Amendment.  Laws restricting speech will be struck down on 
their face if they are impermissibly vague, overbroad, create no set of 
circumstances under which they would be valid,85 or lack any plainly 
legitimate sweep.86  To prevail, a challenger must demonstrate a 
substantial risk that enforcing the law would lead to the suppression 
of speech.87  Facial invalidation is “manifestly strong medicine” that is 
 
 79. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1976) (quoting Cal. Bankers Ass’n. v. 
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78–79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 80. See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1982). 
 81. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (upholding law 
requiring solicitors to stand 100 feet from polling entrances based in part on 
government’s compelling interest in protecting the fundamental right to vote). 
 82. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. 
 83. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). 
 84. See id. at 366–67 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66, 96). 
 85. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 494 & n.5 (1982) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)). 
 86. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010). 
 87. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998). 
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used only as a last resort.88  Accordingly, before striking down a law, a 
court will consider any limiting construction that is proffered.89 
Vagueness and overbreadth challenges are frequently described as 
overlapping theories capable of being analyzed concurrently.90  
However, they are in fact two distinct doctrines.91  A law or regulation 
is vague if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited92 or if it permits 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.93  In the context of laws 
capable of suppressing speech, even greater specificity is required.94  
The overbreadth doctrine provides for facial invalidation of laws that 
prohibit a real and substantial amount of protected speech when 
judged in relation to their overall scope.95 
Overbroad laws risk deterring or “chilling” constitutionally 
protected speech, especially when they impose criminal sanctions.96  
The overbreadth doctrine permits a challenge to a law even though, 
as applied to the defendant, the law is constitutional.97  The purpose is 
to protect society, which, without an available remedy, would be 
deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.  Otherwise, rather 
than challenge the law, many individuals would simply abstain from 
engaging in protected speech.98 
Laws restricting political speech can also be vague99 or in violation 
of the First Amendment as applied to certain speech.100  A plaintiff 
 
 88. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973); see also FW/PBS v. Dallas, 
493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (“[F]acial challenges to legislation are generally 
disfavored.”). 
 89. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 & n.5 (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110). 
 90. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 479 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F.3d 820, 827 (10th Cir. 2005)) (explaining that 
vagueness and overbreadth challenges are “two sides of the same coin”). 
 91. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 92. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Hispanic Leadership Fund v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 1:12cv893, 2012 
WL 4759238, at *16 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2012) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 
573 (1974)). 
 95. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
 96. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also Bates v. State 
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
 97. See, e.g., Hicks, 539 U.S. at 118 (citing Members of City Council of L.A. v. 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796 (1984)). 
 98. See id. at 119 (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1965)). 
 99. See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 872–73 (1997). 
 100. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life (Wisconsin I), 546 U.S. 410, 411–
12 (2006). 
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bringing a First Amendment challenge may argue that the law does 
not meet the requisite level of scrutiny.  For example, a law will be 
deemed invalid where one can show that the government’s 
justification is not sufficient as applied to the restricted speech or 
conduct.101  A plaintiff may also argue that the law interferes with a 
constitutionally protected right warranting heightened scrutiny and 
that the law does not survive the heightened level of scrutiny.  For 
example, although disclosure laws are ordinarily reviewed under 
exacting scrutiny, where compelled disclosure “seriously infringes on 
privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First 
Amendment” such that it would subject minority parties to “threats, 
harassment, or reprisals,” the law will be reviewed under strict 
scrutiny.102 
B. Compelling Disclosure 
1. The Interests in Compelling Disclosure 
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court recognized several 
important governmental interests in compelled disclosure.103  First, 
the public has an interest in knowing the sources of political campaign 
money (“informational interest”).”104  The informational interest can 
be parsed into several separate, but related, interests.  The 
government has an interest in its people knowing which associations 
support particular issues and candidates.105  Members of 
organizations, shareholders, and stakeholders have an interest in 
knowing about an association’s or a corporation’s campaign-related 
speech.106  Finally, voters have an interest in knowing the sources of 
contributions, which allows them “to place each candidate in the 
political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the 
basis of party labels and campaign speeches,” to determine which 
 
 101. Wisconsin II, 551 U.S. 449, 478–79 (2007) (holding that the government’s 
interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of quid pro quo 
corruption did not justify prohibiting use of corporate funds to finance corporation’s 
issue-advocacy advertisements). 
 102. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91–92 
(1982). 
 103. 424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976). 
 104. Id. at 66. 
 105. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003), overruled 
by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 106. See Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 882 (8th Cir. 
2012) (Melloy, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916). 
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interests a candidate will most likely respond to,107 and who stands to 
benefit from that candidate’s election.108  Second, the government has 
an interest in “‘deter[ring] actual corruption and avoid[ing] the 
appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and 
expenditures to the light of publicity’”“”109 (“anti-corruption 
interest”).  In the disclosure context, this interest was most famously 
summarized by Justice Brandeis, who stated that “[s]unlight is said to 
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman.”110  A different type of anti-corruption interest is that of 
preventing the “corrosive and distorting effects” that result when 
immense accretions of wealth by corporations are used for political 
purposes unrelated to the public’s support for the corporation’s 
political ideas (“anti-corporate corruption interest”).111  Third, the 
government has an interest in being able to gather the data that is 
necessary to detect circumventions of its laws.112 
2. The Interests in Avoiding Disclosure 
The right to speak anonymously is recognized both in tradition113 
and in legal precedent.114  The tradition harks back to long before our 
nation’s founders published the Federalist papers under the 
pseudonym “Publius.”115  Throughout history, many writers have used 
pen names, including French enlightenment writer François-Marie 
Arouet, who advocated for freedom of speech under the pen name 
 
 107. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. 
 108. Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 808 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 109. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.  This interest, however, is not consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United that “independent expenditures, 
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption” and, thus, is only relevant in the context of contributions 
made directly to candidates. Swanson, 692 F.3d at 887 (Colloton, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909). 
 110. LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92 (National Home Library 
Foundation ed. 1933); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed. 
Campaign, 533 U.S. 431, 456 (2001); Ill. Liberty PAC v. Madigan, No. 12 C 5811, 2012 
WL 4764152, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2012) (discussing the “prophylactic” effect of 
disclosure), aff’d, No. 12-3305, 2012 WL 5259036 (7th Cir. Oct. 24, 2012). 
 111. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003), overruled by 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 
 112. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67–68. 
 113. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342–43 (1995). 
 114. See, e.g., id. at 357 (invalidating law prohibiting distribution of any 
anonymous campaign literature); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) 
(invalidating law prohibiting distribution of anonymous handbills). 
 115. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342. 
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Voltaire.116  The Supreme Court has recognized that anonymity 
promotes the marketplace of ideas by permitting more speech and 
providing a way for those who may be personally unpopular to ensure 
that readers will not prejudge their message.117  Some scholars argue 
that disclosure laws may actually harm the public, by decreasing the 
quality of public discourse and encouraging “debate about the origins 
of electoral messages rather than about their truth.”118  Anonymity 
also protects persecuted groups that criticize the government from the 
risk of oppression.119  It protects individuals who may fear retaliation 
or social ostracism if they speak openly, or who may desire to 
preserve their privacy.120 
There are also several less noble reasons for wanting to remain 
anonymous.  Individuals and organizations may have an interest in 
avoiding disclosure where they have a personal financial stake in the 
outcome of an election or ballot initiative, particularly where 
disclosing their identity would undermine their efforts to influence 
the outcome.121  Corporations and individuals who serve as executives 
or directors of corporations may have an interest in avoiding backlash 
from shareholders or consumers for using general treasury funds to 
 
 116. See ROGER PEARSON, VOLTAIRE ALMIGHTY: A LIFE IN PURSUIT OF FREEDOM 
406 (2005); see also McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341 n.2. 
 117. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342. 
 118. Johnstone, supra note 37, at 418 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 119. See Talley, 360 U.S. at 64. 
 120. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341–42. 
 121. As an example, in 2012 the people of Maryland voted on a referendum, 
“Question 7,” to expand gambling with the proceeds earmarked for education. S. Bill 
1, 2012 Leg., 2nd Special Sess. (Md. 2012), available at 
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2012s2/bills/sb/sb0001e.pdf.  A group called “Get the 
Facts Vote No on 7” aired advertisements featuring teachers stating that they did not 
believe that any of the proceeds would actually go towards education. Joy Resmovits, 
Maryland Question 7 Pits Casino Against Casino in Debate on Education Dollars, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/12/ 
maryland-question-7-ads_n_1961672.html.  It was later revealed that an owner of 
rival casinos in neighboring states contributed substantially to “Get the Facts Vote 
No on 7.” Id.  FEC Commissioner Weintraub argued that knowing that the rival 
casino owner was a major sponsor of those advertisements would have affected how 
some Maryland voters credited those ads. See Open Meeting of the Federal Election 
Commission (Oct. 12, 2012), available at http://www.fec.gov/audio/2012/ 
2012100407.mp3 (statement of Commissioner Weintraub).  Thus, it would follow that 
the organization receiving the contribution would benefit from not disclosing that 
donor’s identity. 
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support issues or candidates not supported by their shareholders or 
consumers.122 
Candidates and outside groups also may have an interest in the 
names of donors contributing to outside groups remaining 
anonymous.  The promise of anonymity makes it more likely that 
groups producing controversial, but nevertheless effective, attack ads 
will receive donations.123  With adequate funding for outside groups to 
do the heavy lifting, candidates are able to preserve their integrity by 
focusing on positive messaging and staying “above the fray.”124  
Anonymity also provides controversial figures with the ability to 
spend substantial sums to influence an election without risking harm 
to the reputation of the candidate or candidates that they support.125  
Controversial donations, even when they are made to outside groups, 
can reflect negatively on candidates.126  In some cases, the threat of 
negativity is such that candidates have rejected or redirected such 
 
 122. See, e.g., Jennifer Martinez & Tom Hamburger, Target Feels Backlash from 
Shareholders, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010 
/aug/19/nation/la-na-target-shareholders-20100820; Brian Bakst, Target Apologizes 
for Political Donation to Group Supporting Anti-Gay Candidate, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/05/target-apologizes-for-
pol_n_672167.html. 
 123. At least one group has used the promise of anonymity as a selling point to 
potential donors. See W. Tradition P’ship v. Att’y Gen. of State, 271 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont. 
2011) (reciting excerpts from Western Tradition Partnership’s 2010 Election Year 
Program Executive Briefing), cert. granted, judgment rev’d sub nom. on other 
grounds, Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012). 
 124. See Meredith McGehee, Unlimited Contributions to Parties Would Be 
Disastrous, HILL’S CONGRESS BLOG (Oct. 10, 2012, 2:00 PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/campaign/261261-unlimited-contributions-to-
parties-would-be-disastrous#ixzz2HbS9F73h. In 2012, both presidential candidates 
deplored the use of negative ads in the months leading up to the election. Julie Pace 
& David Espo, Romney, Obama Bemoan Attack Ads, but Both Benefit, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 9, 2012, 7:08 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/obama-
pushes-economic-fairness-ad-draws-derision. 
 125. For example, in 2012 it was revealed that Clayton Williams Energy, Inc. 
donated one million dollars to the Super-PAC American Crossroads.  Clayton 
Williams Energy Inc.’s chairman of the board, president, and chief executive officer is 
Clayton Williams, Jr.  Williams, a former Texas Republican gubernatorial nominee, 
lost the election after he made deplorable comments defending rape. See Josh Israel, 
Karl Rove’s Super PAC Accepts $1 Million From Notorious Rape Defender, THINK 
PROGRESS (Sept. 21, 2010, 9:26 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/election/2012/ 
09/21/887631/karl-roves-super-pac-accepts-1-million-from-notorious-rape-defender. 
 126. See, e.g., Bill Maher’s Obama SuperPAC Donation Causing Stir, NPR (Mar. 
28, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/28/149512215/bill-mahers-obama-
superpac-donation-causes-stir. 
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donations.127  In addition, anonymity protects the reputation of 
elected candidates post-election by preventing the media from 
scrutinizing possible special favors to individuals or groups that 
contributed large undisclosed sums supporting a candidate. 
C. The Evolution of the Federal Election Campaign Act: From 
Buckley to Citizens United 
This section briefly examines the development of campaign finance 
jurisprudence over the past half-century.  This overview helps to 
explain how some of the current loopholes in the federal regulations 
came to fruition and what Congress was attempting to solve when it 
enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).  It 
also provides a backdrop for understanding why the FEC 
Commissioners and lower courts are divided over how much 
disclosure the federal and state governments can require. 
In 1974, Congress responded to serious misuses of campaign funds 
during the 1972 Presidential election campaign by amending the 
FECA.  The amendments provided for increased disclosure, imposed 
hard limits on contributions to and expenditures by candidates, and 
created the FEC.  Two years after its passage, the Supreme Court 
evaluated several provisions of the FECA in Buckley v. Valeo.128  The 
Court reviewed the limits on contributions and expenditures under 
strict scrutiny, upholding the former while simultaneously striking 
down the latter.129  In upholding the contribution limits, the Court 
found that the government’s anti-corruption interest was sufficiently 
compelling to justify a limit on contributions to candidates and that 
the limits were narrowly tailored to that interest.130  The Court then 
reviewed the disclosure requirements.  The Court found that, unlike 
limits on candidates’ expenditures, which constituted “direct and 
substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech,” the 
disclosure requirements “impose[d] no ceiling on campaign-related 
 
 127. See, e.g., Alexander Burns, Brown Donates Clayton Williams Money to Anti-
Domestic Violence Group, POLITICO (Aug. 21, 2012, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/burns-haberman/2012/08/brown-donates-clayton-
williams-money-to-antidomestic-132750.html.  In 2012, Senator Brown donated 
$1,000 to an anti-domestic violence group out of an “abundance of caution” after it 
was revealed that the Senator may have received a $1,000 donation from Clayton 
Williams, Jr. in 2010. Id. 
 128. 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976). 
 129. Id. at 64. 
 130. See id. at 29. But see McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1242 
(2013) (agreeing to reconsider this holding). 
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activities” and thus should be reviewed under exacting scrutiny.131  
The Court upheld the requirements, finding that they were 
sufficiently justified by important governmental interests.132 
Before upholding the disclosure requirements, however, the Court 
narrowed several terms in order to avoid vagueness concerns.133  The 
Court narrowed the term “political committees” (defined as any 
group of persons receiving contributions or making expenditures 
exceeding $1,000 in a calendar year)134 to encompass only those 
groups that were “under the control of a candidate or whose major 
purpose was the nomination or election of a candidate.”135  The Court 
construed the term “contributions” to encompass only direct or 
indirect contributions to candidates, political parties, or campaign 
committees, and contributions earmarked for political purposes or 
made in cooperation or with the consent of a candidate, his agent, or 
his authorized political committees.136  The Court narrowed the term 
“expenditure” to encompass only those funds that were used for 
communications that “expressly advocate[d]” for the election or 
defeat of a “clearly identified candidate.”137  These communications 
included those using the words “vote for, elect, support, cast your 
ballot for, Smith for Congress, vote against, defeat, or reject,”138 later 
referred to as the “magic words” test.139 
The Court intended to create a bright-line distinction between 
groups that were “directly and intimately” involved in the election 
process and groups that were less involved.140  The effect, however, 
was that the Court unintentionally provided groups seeking to avoid 
 
 131. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39, 64. 
 132. See id. at 68, 85; see also supra Part I.B.1 for a description of these three 
interests. 
 133. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76–78. 
 134. See id. at 222. 
 135. Id. at 79 n.107. 
 136. Id. at 78.  The FECA defined “contribution” as donations made “for the 
purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or election.” 2 U.S.C. § 
431(e)(1)(A) (1976).  Individuals were prohibited from making contributions 
exceeding $1,000 and were required to report all contributions exceeding $100. See 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79 n.107. 
 137. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.  The FECA defined “expenditure” as spending “for 
the purposes of . . . influencing the nomination . . . or election” of a candidate. 2 
U.S.C. § 431(f) (1976). 
 138. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. 
 139. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003), overruled in 
part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 140. JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33794, GRASSROOTS LOBBYING: 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 9 (2007). 
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disclosure requirements with a clear manual on how to do so.  Groups 
easily circumvented disclosure requirements by replacing the words 
“vote for” or “vote against” with “call [candidate’s name] and tell her 
what you think.”141  By omitting Buckley’s “magic words,” groups 
were able to use misleading names to conceal their identities from the 
public.142 
In 2002, Congress enacted the BCRA143 in order to close the 
loopholes that the Court’s narrow reading of several of the terms 
within the FECA created.144  Congress found that the effectiveness of 
campaign-related ads on influencing elections bore little relation to 
whether the ads used Buckley’s “magic words.”  Congress further 
found that many of the ads eschewing the “magic words” aired within 
sixty days of an election, were specifically designed to influence 
elections, and that spending on these communications had increased 
drastically over the past decade.145  To close this loophole, Congress 
added “electioneering communication” (“EC”) to the category of 
regulable campaign-related activities.146  In addition, the newly 
amended FECA prohibited corporations and unions from using 
general treasury funds to pay for ECs or express advocacy.147  If a 
corporation or union wanted to engage in express advocacy or ECs, it 
had to establish a political action committee (“PAC”) funded by a 
segregated account.  PACs were subject to limits and restrictions on 
the sources from which they could receive contributions.148 
 
 141. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127. 
 142. Id. at 128 (“‘Citizens for Better Medicare,’ for instance, was not a grassroots 
organization of citizens, as its name might suggest, but was instead a platform for an 
association of drug manufacturers.  And ‘Republicans for Clean Air,’ which ran ads 
in the 2000 Republican Presidential primary, was actually an organization consisting 
of just two individuals—brothers who together spent $25 million on ads supporting 
their favored candidate.”). 
 143. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 
(codified in scattered sections of 2, 8, 18, 28, 36, and 47 U.S.C.).  The BCRA 
amended the FECA. See id. 
 144. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 203. 
 145. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127 & n.20.  Congress found that, “in the final two 
months before the 2000 election, 94% of all televised issue ad spots were seen as 
making a case for or against a candidate.” 107 CONG. REC. S2136 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 
2002) (statement of Sen. Snowe) (discussing findings of Annenberg report). 
 146. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 203. 
 147. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act §§ 201–14.  Prior to the BCRA’s enactment, 
the FECA made it “unlawful . . . for any corporation whatever, or any labor 
organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with” certain 
federal elections. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006). 
 148. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4) (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(h)(2013). 
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In 2003, less than one year after the BCRA was enacted, the 
Supreme Court upheld the BCRA’s disclosure requirements in 
McConnell v. FEC.  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that 
speech that fell outside of the scope of Buckley’s “magic words” test 
could not be regulated.149  The Court also upheld the restriction on 
the use of corporate and union general treasury funds to pay for 
ECs,150 reasoning that the restrictions were permissible since the vast 
majority of ads that fell within the EC definition clearly had the 
purpose or effect of influencing voters’ decisions,151 and, thus, were 
“the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”152 
Four years later in Wisconsin II, the Supreme Court reviewed a 
challenge to a restriction on the use of general treasury funds to pay 
for ECs as applied to a nonprofit corporation’s advertisements.153  
Before the Court could examine the constitutionality of the 
restriction, however, it had to determine whether the plaintiff’s 
proposed communications fell within the scope of the provision—
whether they were the functional equivalent of express advocacy.154  
The Court held that the functional equivalent of express advocacy 
encompassed only those communications that were “susceptible of no 
reasonable interpretation other than an appeal to vote for or against a 
specific candidate.”155  The Court determined that the ads were not 
the functional equivalent of express advocacy because they expressed 
an opinion on a legislative issue, encouraged viewers to reach out to 
their representatives in order to press them to adopt a position, did 
not mention anything related to an election, and took no position on 
any candidates’ qualifications for office.156 
 
 149. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 102–03.  In upholding the provisions, the Court quoted 
the lower court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ gave no satisfactory answer as to how 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open speech” could occur when plaintiffs used 
misleading names to obscure their identities from the public. Id. at 197. 
 150. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203. 
 151. Id. at 206. 
 152. Id.  In reaching its holding, the Court reasoned that because it had previously 
found that a ban on general treasury funds to pay for express advocacy was 
constitutional, a similar ban on ECs was also valid to the extent that they were the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203–09. 
 153. Wisconsin II, 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 154. Id. at 456. 
 155. Id. at 451.  This is the “appeal to vote” test. 
 156. Id. at 451–52.  The ads declared that a group of senators had filibustered to 
prevent the appointment of several federal judges and urged viewers to contact 
Wisconsin senators and tell them to oppose the filibuster. Id. at 449. 
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The Court then reviewed the restriction on corporate and union 
use of general treasury funds to finance certain campaign activity 
under strict scrutiny157 and found that the government did not have a 
compelling interest in restricting the use of the nonprofit 
corporation’s general treasury funds for the advertisements in 
question.158  The Court first noted that it had previously found only 
that the government’s anti-corruption interest was sufficiently 
compelling to justify limits on contributions to federal candidates and 
independent expenditures that were the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy.159  The Court then reasoned that, because the 
proposed advertisements were not the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy, the government lacked a compelling interest to 
limit the corporation from using its general treasury funds to pay for 
the ads.160 
Although Wisconsin II did not address BCRA’s disclosure 
requirements, it served as the catalyst for the FEC’s decision to revise 
its rules.161  In 2007, the FEC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking 
to revise rules governing ECs in order to incorporate the Court’s 
holding in Wisconsin II.162  In addition, the Commission proposed 
revising disclosure requirements to accommodate reporting by 
corporations and union organizations using general treasury funds to 
finance ECs.163  Commentators urged the Commission to promulgate 
an exemption for corporations and labor organizations from reporting 
the sources of their general treasury funds.164  They argued that 
general treasuries were largely comprised of funds received by those 
who did not necessarily support the organization’s ECs, and that 
requiring disclosure would be “costly and require an inordinate 
amount of effort.”165  The FEC’s inquiry focused on whether any 
useful information would come from such disclosure166 and whether 
 
 157. See id. at 476–77. 
 158. Id. at 452. 
 159. See id. at 478–81. 
 160. Id. at 481. 
 161. See Electioneering Communications: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 50,261–01 (Aug. 31, 2007). 
 162. See generally Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,899, 72,899–
72,901 (Fed. Election Comm’n Dec. 26, 2007). 
 163. Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,261, 50,271 (Fed. Election 
Comm’n Aug. 31, 2007). 
 164. Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. at 72,910. 
 165. Id. at 72,911. 
 166. See Transcript of Record at 167–68, In re Electioneering Communications 
Notice 2007-16 (Fed. Election Comm’n Oct. 17, 2007), available at 
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broad disclosure would interfere with donors’ interests in remaining 
anonymous.167  Neither the commentators nor the FEC considered 
whether the adopted revisions would create a loophole in the 
reporting requirements.168  Ultimately, the FEC revised its disclosure 
rules “to require corporations and labor organizations to disclose only 
the identities of those persons who made a donation aggregating 
$1,000 or more specifically for the purpose of furthering ECs made by 
that corporation or labor organization,”169 thus mirroring the 
disclosure rules for express advocacy.170 
In 2010, the Court again reviewed the BCRA’s restriction on 
corporations’ and labor organizations’ use of their general treasury 
funds to pay for express advocacy or ECs in Citizens United v. FEC, 
and this time struck it down.171  ’After Congress enacted the BCRA, 
the FEC had promulgated a safe-harbor provision that used a two-
part, eleven-factor balancing test to define certain permissible ECs 
that corporations and unions could produce using general treasury 
funds.172  In reviewing the ban and the correlative safe-harbor 
provision, the Supreme Court deemed the FEC’s multi-factor test a 
prior restraint.173  The Court found that a PAC was a separate 
 
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/electioneering_comm/2007/ec_hearing_finaltranscript10
-17-07.pdf (statements of Comm’r Weintraub and Donald Simon, Counsel, 
Democracy 21). 
 167. Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,899, 72,901 (Fed. Election 
Comm’n Dec. 26, 2007). 
 168. See Audio recording: Open Meeting of the Fed. Election Comm’n (Oct. 4, 
2012), available at http://www.fec.gov/audio/2012/2012100407.mp3 (explaining how 
the intent of the Commission was not to undermine the laws that it was trying to 
implement) (statement of Comm’r Weintraub).  According to a report from Public 
Citizen, the percentage of groups disclosing the financiers of their ads fell from nearly 
100% before Wisconsin II to less than 50% in 2008 and to just over a 33% in 2010.  In 
2010, groups making ECs disclosed the sources for just 23.3% of the money that was 
spent on ECs.  The top ten electioneering groups disclosed only 10.8% of money 
spent. Id. See generally Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. at 72,899–
72,901. 
 169. Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. at 72,911 (emphasis added). 
 170. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 62–63 (1976). 
 171. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (overruling 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) and partially 
overruling McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)).  The Court held 
that requiring a corporation or union to speak through a separate entity was an 
“outright ban” on speech. Id. at 337. 
 172. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.15 (2013), invalidated by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 . 
 173. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335.  There is a strong presumption against the 
constitutionality of prior restraints. 2 RODNEY SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 15:2 (1994).  The canon was derived from sixteenth and 
seventeenth century English laws that conditioned speech upon first obtaining a 
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association and thus did not allow the corporation to speak.174  
According to the Court, even if a PAC did allow a corporation to 
speak, it was a “burdensome alternative” and, therefore, the option to 
form one did not diminish First Amendment concerns.175 
The Court also reviewed a challenge to the disclosure requirements 
for ECs and voted 8-1 to uphold them,176 finding that the 
informational interest alone was sufficient to justify the disclosure 
requirements.177  The Court expressly rejected the petitioner’s 
contention that the Constitution required disclosure requirements to 
be confined to speech that is the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy as it had done in Wisconsin II in the context of restrictions 
on independent expenditures.178  Justice Kennedy, who authored the 
opinion, lauded the disclosure requirements, calling them “an 
effective means” of providing the public with the information 
necessary to “hold corporations and elected officials accountable,” 
and to determine whether elected officials were “‘in the pocket’ of so-
called moneyed interests.”179 
Notwithstanding Justice Kennedy’s proclamation, the Supreme 
Court was not tasked with determining whether the FECA’s 
provisions were an effective means of bringing about meaningful 
disclosure.  Rather, those duties are assigned to Congress and the 
FEC.  In fact, several of the Supreme Court’s decisions inadvertently 
created some of the easily exploitable loopholes in the BCRA that 
have since undermined the law’s efficacy.180  Although some public 
officials were quick to recognize and express concern over the 
 
license, and which are seen as being at odds with the principles of the First 
Amendment. See Taucher v. Rainer, 237 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2002).  The Court 
cited the complex web of regulatory rules and explanations that, when coupled with 
the deference that courts give to agency decisions, practically required organizations 
to receive prior consent from the agency before speaking, if it wanted to avoid the 
risk of criminal liability and costly legal fees. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335. 
 174. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–38. 
 175. Id. (“[PACs] are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations. 
For example, every PAC must appoint a treasurer, forward donations to the 
treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons making 
donations, preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and 
report changes to this information within 10 days.”). 
 176. Id. at 316. 
 177. See id. at 369. 
 178. Id. at 368–69. 
 179. Id. at 370 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court also found that the 
Internet made disclosure both “rapid and informative.” Id. 
 180. See infra Part II.A.2.a. 
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possible effects of the Supreme Court’s decisions,181 Congress and the 
FEC have yet to act.182  As a result, organizations have found and 
have been able to exploit a myriad of loopholes in the FECA and its 
related regulations.183 
II.  THE CURRENT STATE OF THE FEDERAL DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS 
A. The Current Federal Disclosure Requirements 
Under the FECA, organizations are separated into two 
categories—those that are subject to continued reporting and 
disclosure requirements, and those that are subject to more limited, 
event-driven requirements.  A political organization must register 
with the FEC as a PAC if a candidate controls it or if it accepts 
contributions or makes expenditures aggregating more than $1,000 in 
a calendar year and has as its “major purpose” the “nomination or 
election of a [federal] candidate.”184  In addition to extensive 
disclosure requirements, PACs are also subject to contribution 
limits185 and restrictions on the types of sources from which they can 
receive contributions.186 PACs making only independent 
expenditures187 (more commonly known as Super PACs), however, 
 
 181. See, e.g., State of the Union Address, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 8 (Jan. 
27, 2010). 
 182. See Trevor Potter, President, Campaign Legal Ctr., Address to the Annual 




releases&Itemid=61; see also David M. Herszenhorn, Campaign Finance Bill Is Set 
Aside, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, at A14 (discussing Congress’s inability to pass the 
DISCLOSE Act).  The FEC did put out a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 
December 27, 2011 after two previous attempts failed.  Independent Expenditures 
and Electioneering Communications by Corporations and Labor Organizations, 76 
Fed. Reg. 80,803-01 (proposed Dec. 27, 2011).  Comments were submitted and a 
hearing was held on March 7, 2012. Id.  The FEC has yet to take any further action. 
Id. 
 183. See, e.g., Interview by Bill Moyers with Trevor Potter, President, Campaign 
Legal Ctr. (PBS television broadcast Nov. 16, 2012), available at 
http://billmoyers.com/segment/trevor-potter-on-fighting-big-money-in-the-2012-
election. 
 184. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (2006). 
 185. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a. 
 186. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.4, 114.2, 115.2 (2013). 
 187. An independent expenditure is “an expenditure . . . for a communication 
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate that is not 
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are exempt from these limits and restrictions,188 but are not exempt 
from the disclosure and reporting requirements.189  To comply with 
the disclosure regulations, PACs must register,190 designate a 
treasurer191 and committee bank account,192 maintain records for 
receipts and disbursements,193 report independent expenditures,194 and 
file periodic disclosure reports revealing the source of every 
contribution exceeding $100 and the recipient and purpose of every 
expenditure over $100.195  If the PAC wants to cease filing disclosure 
reports, it must first file a termination report or a written statement 
with the FEC.196 
Individuals and all other organizations that are not PACs—e.g., 
non-profit organizations that fall within § 501(c)(4) (social welfare 
organizations), § 501(c)(5) (unions), and § 501(c)(6) (trade 
associations) of the Internal Revenue Code—need only file disclosure 
statements with the FEC when they purchase “electioneering 
communications”197 or advertisements that expressly advocate for the 
election or defeat of a candidate.198 
Electioneering Communications (ECs) are defined as 
 
made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, 
a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, or their agents, or a political party 
or its agents.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a). 
 188. See SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(holding that FECA provision limiting contributions by individuals that made only 
independent expenditures that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a 
candidate, violated First Amendment free speech rights); Commonsense Ten, A.O. 
2010-11, 2010 WL 3184269 (Fed. Election Comm’n July 22, 2010) (extending the 
court’s holding in SpeechNow.org to apply to corporations, labor organizations, and 
PACs); Club for Growth, A.O. 2010-09, 2010 WL 3184267 (Fed. Election Comm’n 
July 22, 2010) (same). 
 189. See Commonsense Ten, A.O. 2010-11, 2010 WL 3184269 (Fed. Election 
Comm’n July 22, 2010); Club for Growth, A.O. 2010-09, 2010 WL 3184267 (Fed. 
Election Comm’n July 22, 2010). 
 190. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.1. 
 191. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.2(iv). 
 192. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.2(vi). 
 193. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.8. 
 194. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 104.3(b)(3)(vii)(A)(2013), 104.4(a)–(f)(2013), 109.10(c). 
 195. 11 C.F.R. § 104.5(c).  PACs that are not authorized committees of candidates 
may file quarterly or monthly reports. 
 196. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.3(a)(1). 
 197. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(b). 
 198. See Coordinated Communications and Independent Expenditures, FED. 
ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/indexp.shtml (last updated 
Jan. 2013). 
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any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that: (1) [r]efers to 
a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (2) [i]s publicly 
distributed within 60 days before a general election for the office 
sought by the candidate; or within 30 days before a primary or 
preference election . . . and (3) [i]s targeted to the relevant 
electorate.199 
Once an individual or organization spends more than $10,000 in the 
aggregate on ECs, it must, within twenty-four hours, file a report with 
the FEC that includes the date and title of the communication, the 
name and address of any donor contributing $1,000 or more since the 
first day of the previous year for the purpose of furthering ECs, and 
the name and address of officers, directors, and the executive director 
of the organization.200  Subsequent reports must also be filed for any 
additional ECs aggregating in an additional excess of $10,000 in the 
same calendar year.201 
Express advocacy is defined as any communication that uses 
phrases similar to Buckley’s “magic words” or that could only be 
interpreted as advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.202  
Once the total cost of express advocacy with respect to a given 
election exceeds $250, an individual or organization must file a report 
disclosing the identity of any payee, the candidate supported or 
opposed, and the name, address, employer and occupation of any 
donor who gave more than $200 during the year for the purpose of 
making independent expenditures.203  In addition, individuals and 
organizations must file additional reports when their aggregate 
independent expenditure spending exceeds certain amounts during 
election periods.204 
B. The Inadequacies of the Federal Requirements 
1. Various Ways of Avoiding Disclosure Under the FECA 
The FECA limits the amount that individuals and organizations 
can contribute to candidates and PACs that coordinate with or 
contribute to candidates.  If individuals want to make unlimited 
 
 199. 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a). 
 200. 11 C.F.R. § 104.20. 
 201. 11 C.F.R. § 104.20. 
 202. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(a)-(b). 
 203. 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(b). 
 204. 11 C.F.R. §§ 104.4(b)(2), (c), 109.10(b). 
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contributions or expenditures for campaign-related activity,205 they 
have three options: they can make non-coordinated expenditures,206 
contribute to Super PACs or non-PAC organizations,207 or create a 
shell corporation which can be used to funnel money to various 
organizations.208  If an individual wants to pay for independent 
expenditures or ECs, he will have to disclose his identity once he 
spends more than the threshold amount.209  If an individual instead 
prefers to pool his money with others, thereby delegating control to 
organizations with more political savvy, he may donate unlimited 
funds to a Super PAC or non-PAC organization.210 
If the individual contributes to a Super PAC, however, his identity 
will be disclosed if he contributes more than $100 in a calendar year.211  
Likewise, if he contributes to a non-PAC organization, his identity 
will be disclosed if he gives more than $250 for the purpose of making 
independent expenditures or $1,000 for the purpose of furthering 
ECs.212  If, instead, the individual would prefer not to have his identity 
revealed, he can donate unlimited funds for general use to a non-PAC 
organization.213  His identity will also not be revealed if the non-PAC 
organization receiving his contribution elects not to pay for express 
advocacy or ECs, but instead uses the contribution to make its own 
contribution to a Super PAC or a non-PAC organization.  This 
indirect contribution is generally referred to as “campaign money 
laundering,”214 which is perfectly legal under federal laws.215 
 
 205. The proceeding analysis also would apply to non-PAC organizations, 
corporations, and labor unions. 
 206. See The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law, FED. ELECTION 
COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml (last updated Jan. 2013). 
 207. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 208. See, e.g., Justin Sink, Colbert Creates Shell Corporation to Lampoon Karl 
Rove’s Groups, HILL BLOG (Sept. 30, 2012, 10:31 AM), http://thehill.com/video/in-
the-news/184755-colbert-creates-shell-corporation-to-lampoon-rove-money-
laundering. 
 209. See supra notes 200–01, 203 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra note 207. 
 211. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra notes 200, 203 and accompanying text. 
 213. See, e.g., Emily’s List v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 581 F.3d 1, 16 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 
2009). 
 214. Andy Kroll, California’s Biggest “Campaign Money Laundering” Scheme, 
Revealed—Kinda, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/ 
mojo/2012/11/california-americans-responsible-leadership-donation-jerry-brown. 
 215. See Interview by Bill Moyers with Trevor Potter, President, Campaign Legal 
Ctr. (PBS television broadcast Sept. 21, 2012), available at 
http://billmoyers.com/segment/trevor-potter-on-fighting-big-money-in-the-2012-
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If the individual is particularly concerned about privacy, he can set 
up a shell corporation using an obscure name, preferably 
incorporated, in a state that requires minimum disclosure.216  Once 
established, anyone can funnel unlimited funds through the shell 
corporation either to a Super PAC or to a non-PAC organization.  
Since Super PACs and other organizations must only disclose the 
immediate sources of their funding, the only information revealed will 
be that of the shell corporation.217  If the individual is absolutely 
determined to hide his identity, he can “create structures that 
resemble the corporate equivalent of matrushka dolls” by funneling 
money through multiple legal entities.218 
2. The Effect of Splits on Disclosure 
At present, the FEC Commissioners are divided evenly over what 
constitutes express advocacy and electioneering communications, and 
over what types of activity qualify a group as a PAC.  The effect of 
these splits is that the agency lacks the four votes necessary to 
commence enforcement proceedings against groups that, according to 
three of the Commissioners, are engaged in express advocacy, ECs, or 
that qualify as PACs, but have not complied with the requisite 
disclosure requirements.219 
a. Defining Express Advocacy 
The FEC is split over whether it acted outside of its statutory and 
constitutional authority in promulgating and continuing to enforce it’s 
definition of “express advocacy” under § 100.22(b).220  The FEC 
promulgated subsection (b) in 1995 after two courts held that express 
 
election/.  However, in some states, such action is illegal. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 84302 (West 2012). 
 216. See Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-
thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html. 
 217. See, e.g., Freedom Works for America, Report of Receipts and 
Disbursements (FEC Form 3X) at 169–72 (Dec. 6, 2012), available at 
http://images.nictusa.com/pdf/285/12941445285/12941445285.pdf (showing $5,300,000 
in year-to-date aggregate contributions by Specialty Group, Inc.). 
 218. Ellen L. Weintraub & Samuel C. Brown, Following the Money: Campaign 
Finance Disclosure in India and the United States, 11 ELECTION L.J. 241, 264 (2012). 
 219. See generally infra Part II.A.2.b.i–iii. 
 220. See generally 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (2013).  Section 100.22 defines express 
advocacy.  Section 100.22(a) lists phrases including those referenced by the Supreme 
Court in Buckley that, if used, would constitute express advocacy. 
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advocacy extended beyond the “magic words” of Buckley.  First, in 
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Supreme Court held that 
a detachable voter guide listing the names of pro-life candidates next 
to the words “Vote Pro-Life” was express advocacy.221  The Court 
reasoned that the fact that the communication was marginally less 
direct than Buckley’s magic words was not dispositive where the 
message supplied “in effect an explicit directive” to vote for the 
named candidates.222  The following year, the Ninth Circuit held in 
FEC v. Furgatch that a newspaper ad criticizing the president, 
published three days before the presidential election, and asserting 
“DON’T LET HIM DO IT” was express advocacy.223  The Court 
reasoned that express advocacy included words not listed by the 
Supreme Court in Buckley which, “when read as a whole and with 
limited reference to external events, [were] susceptible of no other 
reasonable interpretation than an exhortation to vote for or against a 
specific candidate.”224  The FEC subsequently revised § 100.22, adding 
to the list of examples of express advocacy in subsection (a)225 and 
adopting subsection (b), which incorporates the language of Furgatch 
practically verbatim.226 
Shortly after the FEC implemented § 100.22(b), several courts 
found it invalid on constitutional and statutory grounds.227  As a result 
 
 221. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1986). 
 222. Id. at 249. 
 223. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 864–65 (9th Cir. 1987).  The 
advertisement also stated, “If [the President] succeeds the country will be burdened 
with four more years of incoherencies, ineptness and illusion.” Id. at 858. 
 224. Id. at 864. 
 225. Notice 1995-10: Express Advocacy; Independent Expenditures; Corporate 
and Labor Organization Expenditures, 60 Fed. Reg. 35292, 35293, 35295 (July 6, 
1995).  Section 100.22(b) provides that express advocacy means communications that 
[w]hen taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events, such 
as the proximity to the election, could only be interpreted by a reasonable 
person as containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more 
clearly identified candidate(s) because—(1) The electoral portion of the 
communication is unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of only one 
meaning; and (2) [r]easonable minds could not differ as to whether it 
encourages actions to elect or defeat one or more clearly identified 
candidate(s) or encourages some other kind of action. 
11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (2013). 
 226. Notice 1995-10: Express Advocacy; Independent Expenditures; Corporate 
and Labor Organization Expenditures, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,292, 35,295 (Fed. Election 
Comm’n July 6, 1995) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 106, 109, 114). 
 227. See Va. Soc’y for Human Life v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 263 F.3d 379, 392 
(4th Cir. 2001); Right to Life of Dutchess Cnty. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 6 F. Supp. 
2d 248, 253–54 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Me. Right to Life Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
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of these decisions, the FEC ceased enforcement of § 100.22(b) in 
those circuits that held it invalid.228  In McConnell, the Supreme Court 
clarified by stating that Buckley’s limiting construction was “a 
product of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional command.”229  
In light of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement, the Fourth Circuit in 
Real Truth About Abortion v. FEC reversed course,230 and the FEC 
resumed enforcement of § 100.22(b).231 
FEC Commissioners McGahn, Hunter, and Peterson believe that 
subsection (b) is unconstitutionally vague.232  Commissioner McGahn 
makes two interrelated points.  First, he maintains that § 100.22(b) is 
unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it reaches speech that is 
not express advocacy as the Supreme Court defined it in Buckley.233  
McGahn reads McConnell as only upholding the EC provisions to the 
extent that the speech being regulated is the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy.234  He believes that the Supreme Court only upheld 
the EC provision regulating speech that was the functional equivalent 
of express advocacy because the provision contained objective 
triggers, which are missing from the express advocacy provision.235 
 
914 F. Supp. 8, 13 (D. Me. 1996), aff’d, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Fed. 
Election Comm’n v. Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. 946, 958–59 (W.D. Va. 
1995), aff’d, No. 95-2600, 1996 WL 431996(4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1996). 
 228. See Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft A, at 25 (Fed. Election Comm’n 
Aug. 24, 2012). 
 229. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 103 (2003), overruled by 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see id. at 278 n.11 
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (noting that the Court had essentially overruled every 
Court of Appeals that had addressed the issue except the Ninth Circuit). 
 230. 681 F.3d 544, 550 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 841 (2013). 
 231. See Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft A, at 29 (resuming enforcement of 
§ 100.22(b) in order to “fill[] the gaps left by the Supreme Court between express 
advocacy in Buckley and Mass. Citizens for Life and the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy in ECs in McConnell” (citation omitted)). 
 232. See id. at 9. 
 233. DONALD F. MCGAHN, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, MUR 5831 (Softer Voices), 
STATEMENT OF REASONS OF COMMISSIONER DONALD F. MCGAHN 27 & n.132 (2011), 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/48130178/Mur-5831-Softer-Voices-Mcgahn-
Sor-Final. 
 234. Id. at 8 & n.36. 
 235. Id. at 26 & n.120 (discussing how the “appeal to vote” test is not “free-
floating” and is only triggered if speech meets additional bright-line requirements).  
The Seventh Circuit appeared to lend some support to this argument, noting, in 
upholding a state EC provision against a vagueness challenge, that the law was 
limited by the same five factors—medium, total amount spent, time, geography, and 
content—as the law that was upheld in Wisconsin II. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom 
v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 485 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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Secondly, McGahn asserts that, even if subsection (b) could 
constitutionally regulate speech that was not express advocacy or its 
functional equivalent, it would still be unconstitutional because it is 
inherently vague.236  He believes that subsection (b) contains several 
terms that are inherently vague and inconsistent with each other, such 
as the requirement that the FEC consider the communication “taken 
as a whole” as well as its “electoral portion.”237  McGahn argues that, 
unlike the EC provision, subsection (b) invites the FEC to consider 
“rough-and-tumble” factors, such as contextual references and 
general proximity to the election, that the Court ordered the agency 
to eschew, and which are sufficiently similar to the two-part eleven-
factor test that the Supreme Court struck down in Citizens United.238 
Commissioners McGahn, Hunter, and Peterson further argue that 
the agency lacks the jurisdictional capacity to act.  They contend that 
McConnell did not overrule prior decisions invalidating subsection 
(b) on statutory grounds.239  They then further contend that the 
Fourth Circuit in Real Truth About Abortion never addressed the 
FEC’s statutory authority and, thus, did not overrule prior cases 
within its jurisdiction invalidating § 100.22(b) on statutory grounds.240  
Commissioner McGahn reasons when the Supreme Court stated that 
Buckley’s interpretation was “the endpoint of statutory 
 
 236. MCGAHN, supra note 233, at 12–14. But see Real Truth About Abortion v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 841 
(2013); Transcript of Oral Ruling, Free Speech v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 12-CV-
127-SWS (D. Wyo. Oct. 3, 2012), appeal docketed, No. 12-8078 (10th Cir. Oct. 19, 
2013), available at http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/freespeech_dc_transcript.pdf. 
 237. MCGAHN, supra note 233, at 12–14. 
 238. Id. at 17 & n.70. 
 239. Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft A, at 29 (citing N.M. Youth Org. v. 
Herrera, 611 F.3d 669 (10th Cir. 2010); N.C. Right to Life v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th 
Cir. 2008); Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655 (5th Cir. 2006); 
Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2004); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. 
Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2003)).  The Commissioners point to several court 
decisions holding that Buckley’s magic words requirement “was not altered by 
McConnell and remains a viable way to cure an otherwise vague statute.” Id. 
 240. See CAROLINE C. HUNTER ET AL., FED. ELECTION COMM’N, STATEMENT ON 
A.O. 2012-11 (FREE SPEECH), at 4 n.8 (2012), available at 
http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1209339.pdf (listing Right to Life of Dutchess Cnty. v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248, 253–254 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Me. Right to Life 
Comm’n. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 914 F. Supp. 8, 13 (D. Me. 1996), aff’d, 98 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 1996); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. 946, 
958 (W.D. Va. 1995), aff’d, 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished)). 
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construction,”241 it spoke to the issue and the FEC should not second-
guess the Court.  He argues that, even if the FEC had the authority to 
promulgate subsection (b), which he believes it did not, in order to 
properly revive it, the FEC would have had to utilize Notice and 
Comment Rulemaking.242 
Moreover, McGahn, Peterson, and Hunter point out that when 
Congress amended the FECA in 2002, it did not grant the FEC 
authority to expand the definition of express advocacy.  Contrariwise, 
Congress considered and ultimately rejected an amendment that 
would have expanded the definition of express advocacy due to 
concerns over its constitutionality.243  They assert that, at the time of 
the BCRA’s enactment, several members of Congress believed that § 
100.22(b) was unconstitutional and were aware that the FEC was not 
enforcing it.244  They argue that, by refusing to expand the definition 
of express advocacy, Congress, at a minimum, accepted the 
preexisting construction.245  In short, they believe the FEC should 
cease enforcing the regulation in order to avoid enmeshing itself in 
“‘serious statutory and constitutional questions’ raised by intercircuit 
nonacquiescence.”246 and that complete abandonment of the rule in 
all jurisdictions is necessary given the increased use of media to target 
national audiences without regard for jurisdictional boundaries.247 
 
 241. MCGAHN, supra note 233, at 28 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003) overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). 
 242. See id. at 8 n.35.  The Commissioner, however, cites cases indicating that there 
is a split among the circuit courts over this issue. Id. 
 243. Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft A, at 11–12 (Fed. Election Comm’n Apr. 12, 
2012). 
 244. See MCGAHN, supra note 233, at 30.  McGahn makes the point that, although 
the FEC had stated that it would cease enforcement only in those circuits that had 
found it unconstitutional, the practical effect of its policy was that the FEC ceased 
enforcement in all jurisdictions. Id.; see also Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft A, at 
15. 
 245. Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft A, at 15. 
 246. See Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft A, at 32 (Fed. Election Comm’n 
Aug. 24, 2012).  Intercircuit nonacquiescence occurs when the court that ordinarily 
reviews the agency’s action has not addressed a question, but a sister circuit has, and 
the federal agency refuses to acquiesce to the sister circuit’s precedent. Ross E. 
Davies, Remedial Nonacquiescence, 89 IOWA L. REV. 65, 71 (2003).  Generally, 
courts will not find fault with such a position where the nonacquiescing party 
reasonably believes that it might prevail. See id. 71 & n.15. 
 247. Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft A, at 34–35 (arguing that enforcement 
in only those jurisdictions that have upheld § 100.22(b) would “subject [such 
advertising] to inconsistent regulatory standards[,]” forcing speakers to retain a 
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Nevertheless, without the four votes necessary to cease 
enforcement, Commissioners McGahn, Peterson, and Hunter 
continue to construe § 100.22(b) narrowly.248  They believe that, 
because § 100.22(b) follows the court’s holding in Furgatch, the FEC 
should adhere to the central holding of Furgatch, which, according to 
these Commissioners, was that express advocacy must contain some 
explicit words of advocacy.249  They believe that the FEC should find 
that speech is not express advocacy if “any reasonable alternative 
reading of speech can be suggested.”250  These Commissioners reject 
the test used by the other three Commissioners, calling it “inherently 
vague” and prone to the same constitutional infirmities described by 
the Court in Wisconsin II251 and claiming further that such a test 
would cause some communications to qualify as both independent 
expenditures and as ECs, which is prohibited by the FECA and 
creates a filing conundrum for speakers.252 
Under these three Commissioners’ interpretations of § 100.22(b), 
the following two advertisements do not constitute express advocacy.  
Advertisement 1 states: “[Candidate X] has been one of the least 
effective members of Congress.  This fall, let’s make history by 
changing that.  Learn about HR 3638.”253  Advertisement 2 states: 
“Military voting matters.  That’s why [Candidate X] is such a 
disappointment . . . .  [S]houldn’t military voices and votes matter?  
Shouldn’t yours?  Be heard this fall.”254  Why?  Nothing in the 
advertisements “explicitly inform[s] the listener that there is an 
election coming up or associate[s] the communication’s message with 
a federal campaign.”255  The fact that listeners may be aware that an 
 
campaign finance attorney, conduct demographic marketing research, or seek 
declaratory rulings before speaking, in violation of the First Amendment). 
 248. Id. at 9. 
 249. Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft A, at 9 (reasoning that the Ninth Circuit 
emphasized that the words “don’t let him” were a simple and direct command to vote 
against the candidate).  Section 100.22(b) omits the second “clear plea for action” 
standard from the three-part standard set forth in Furgatch. Id. at 9 n.6. 
 250. Id. at 9. 
 251. See id. at 20. 
 252. See id. at 17–18; see also 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B)(ii) (2006) (the term 
“electioneering communication” does not include “a communication which 
constitutes an expenditure or an independent expenditure under this Act”); 11 C.F.R. 
§ 100.29(c)(3) (2013) (any communication that “[c]onstitutes an expenditure or 
independent expenditure provided that the expenditure or independent expenditure 
is required to be reported under the Act or Commission regulations” is not an EC). 
 253. Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft A, at 13. 
 254. See id. at 17. 
 255. Id. at 13. 
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election is coming does not make the communication electoral in 
nature.256  Moreover, even if part of the advertisement included an 
unambiguous reference to the election, reasonable minds could still 
differ as to whether the advertisement exhorts the election or defeat 
of a candidate,257 as opposed to encouraging individuals to contact the 
candidates, protest outside of their office, or write letters to the 
editors of local newspapers.258 
On the other hand, Commissioners Weintraub, Walther, and 
Bauerly259 believe that § 100.22(b) is constitutional and that the FEC 
has the requisite authority to enforce it.  They reason that McConnell 
foreclosed any debate as to whether express advocacy could 
constitutionally encompass speech that falls outside of the scope of 
Buckley’s magic words.260  Moreover, they believe that the test in 
subsection (b) is practically identical to the “appeal to vote” test, 
which the Supreme Court upheld in Wisconsin II in that it employs 
objective and restrictive criteria.261  Finally, they argue that any 
lingering doubts regarding § 100.22(b)’s constitutionality should have 
been eliminated post-Citizen’s United, since the regulation now acts 
solely as a trigger for disclosure requirements and no longer as a ban 
on certain types of speech.262  Proponents of this viewpoint also stress 
that the Supreme Court’s two most recent decisions expressly reject 
attempts to limit the scope of express advocacy to Buckley’s magic 
 
 256. Id. (citing Brief of Appellees FEC and U.S. DOJ at 41, Real Truth About 
Abortion v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 841 (2013)). 
 257. Id. at 14 (quoting 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (2013)). 
 258. See id. at 18. 
 259. Commissioner Bauerly resigned from the FEC on February 1, 2013. Bauerly 
Departs Federal Election Commission, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION (Feb. 1, 2013), 
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/20130201_BauerlyDeparture.shtml. 
 260. See Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11, at 2 (Fed. Election Comm’n) (Weintraub et 
al., concurring) (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 189–94 
(2003), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); id. at 278 n.11 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 261. Nat’l Def. Comm., Comments on A.O. Request 2012-27, at 4–5 (Fed. Election 
Comm’n Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/ 
attachments/CLC__D21_Comments_on_AOR_2012-
27_Nat__Def__Comm__8_6_12.pdf (emphasizing that § 100.22(b) uses a similar 
reasonability requirement and mandates that a communication be unambiguous). 
 262. See id. at 4. 
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words,263 or to limit disclosure to the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy.264 
There are two primary arguments that can be made in support of 
the position that the FEC has the requisite authority to enforce 
subsection (b).  First, when Congress codified the term “expressly 
advocating,” it made no attempt to define or limit it.265  Thus, in 
promulgating subsection (b), the FEC lawfully exercised its 
administrative duty to “prescribe rules [and] regulations . . . to carry 
out the provisions of [FECA].”266  The Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of express advocacy in Buckley did not foreclose any 
subsequent agency interpretation.  The Supreme Court has stated 
that “a court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an 
agency construction entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior 
court decision holds that its construction follows from the 
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency 
discretion.”267  Because Congress did not speak directly to the issue, 
the proper question for the reviewing court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible interpretation of the statute.268 
Second, when Congress amended the FECA in 2002, it was aware 
of the potential constitutional issues surrounding § 100.22(b).269  
Although Congress could have acted to limit the agency’s authority to 
interpret express advocacy, it did not.  Additionally, out of an 
abundance of caution and in part due to an inability to come to an 
agreement over the EC provision, eighty-two Senators voted to adopt 
an amendment that essentially acted as a fail-safe device if the EC 
provision was subsequently invalidated.270  The amendment’s sponsor, 
 
 263. Id. at 4 (citing Wisconsin II, 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007)). 
 264. See, e.g., Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 54 (1st Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012). 
 265. See Brief of Appellee Federal Election Commission at 39, Free Speech v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, No. 12-8078 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2013). 
 266. Id. at 39–40 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(8) (2006)). 
 267. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 
(2005) (emphasis added).  The Court reasoned that allowing a judicial precedent to 
foreclose any subsequent agency interpretation would undermine Chevron’s basis, 
which was that it is the primary responsibility of agencies, not courts, to fill statutory 
gaps. Id. 
 268. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
 269. See, e.g., 11 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM 
ACT OF 2002, at 82–98 (William H. Manz ed., 2003). 
 270. The fail-safe provision provides: 
If [the provision defining ECs] is held to be constitutionally insufficient by 
final judicial decision to support the regulation provided herein, then the 
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Senator Arlen Specter, explained that the fail-safe provision was a 
streamlined version of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Furgatch.271  
Thus, by adopting the Furgatch approach as an alternative to the EC 
provision, Congress implied that it believed that Furgatch was 
constitutional.  Even more tellingly, Senator Specter explained that 
the final sentence of the amendment, which provides that “nothing in 
this subsection shall be construed to affect the interpretation or 
application of 11 C.F.R. [§] 100.22(b),” referred to the “the current 
FEC regulation.”272 
From the perspective of Commissioners Weintraub, Walther, and 
Bauerly’, each of the advertisements described above contains 
unmistakable and unambiguous election portions, and no reasonable 
person could find that those portions do not urge defeating or voting 
against the candidates in the fall election273 and, therefore are 
regulable pursuant to subsection (b).274  They refute the other three 
Commissioners’ contention that the final sentence of the first 
advertisement (“Learn about HR 3638”) alters the nature of the 
entire ad, finding instead that it simply makes an additional point.275 
b. Defining an Electioneering Communication 
The FEC is also divided over the proper interpretation of the 
provision defining “clearly identified” as it pertains to ECs in 11 
C.F.R. § 100.29.  Prior to Congress’s enactment of the BCRA, the 
term “clearly identified,” which was used in the independent 
expenditure provision was defined in 2 U.S.C. § 431(18) and in 11 
 
term “electioneering communication” means any broadcast, cable, or 
satellite communication which promotes or supports a candidate for that 
office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of 
whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a 
candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other than 
an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate. 
2 U.S.C. § 434 (2006). 
 271. 141 CONG. REC. S3118-23 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2001).  The provision omitted the 
words “unmistakable” and “unambiguous.” Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft B, at 5, 7 (Fed. Election Comm’n Aug. 
23, 2012). 
 274. Id. at 5, 7.  The Commissioners were deadlocked over whether several other 
advertisements constituted “express advocacy.” See Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft 
A, at 7–9. 
 275. Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft B, at 5. 
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C.F.R. § 100.17.276  After the BCRA was enacted, the FEC 
promulgated a rule adopting the pre-existing definition of “clearly 
identified” for use in the context of ECs.277 
Commissioners McGahn, Peterson, and Hunter argue that 
Congress intended the provisions to be “narrow, objective, and clear” 
in order to avoid the same type of vagueness concerns that caused the 
Court in Buckley to narrowly construe the FECA provisions278 and 
that both Congress and the FEC intended the language to mean the 
same thing in the context of independent expenditures and ECs.  
Accordingly, these Commissioners found that the following three 
advertisements constituted ECs.  In the first advertisement, a 
voiceover attributed the United States’ dependence on foreign oil to 
“the Administration,” and “the White House,” while an image of the 
White House was displayed on the screen.  The ad concluded by 
informing viewers to “call the White House at (202) 456-1414” and 
“[t]ell [them] it’s time for an American energy plan . . . that actually 
works for America.”279 
The second advertisement omitted any reference to the 
Administration and the White House, instead referring to “the 
government.”  The advertisement featured images of the White 
House and the Washington Monument and included a recording of 
the President stating “[w]e must end our dependence on foreign 
oil.”280 
The third advertisement used the words, “Secretary Sebelius,” “the 
Government,” “the Administration,” and displayed footage of the 
White House, while a voiceover instructed viewers to “[c]all Secretary 
 
 276. 2 U.S.C. § 431(18) (2006) (“The term ‘clearly identified’ means that—(A) the 
name of the candidate involved appears; (B) a photograph or drawing of the 
candidate appears; or (C) the identity of the candidate is apparent by unambiguous 
reference.”); 11 C.F.R. § 100.17 (2013) (“The term clearly identified means the 
candidate’s name, nickname, photograph, or drawing appears, or the identity of the 
candidate is otherwise apparent through an unambiguous reference such as ‘the 
President,’ ‘your Congressman,’ or ‘the incumbent,’ or through an unambiguous 
reference to his or her status as a candidate such as ‘the Democratic presidential 
nominee’ or ‘the Republican candidate for Senate in the State of Georgia.’”). 
 277. 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(2) (2013). 
 278. Am. Future Fund, Statement of Commissioner Donald F. McGahn on A.O. 
2012-19, at 6, (Fed. Election Comm’n June 7, 2012). 
 279. Am. Future Fund, A.O. 2012-19 Draft A, at 3–4, 9 (Fed. Election Comm’n 
June 7, 2012). 
 280. Id. at 6. 
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Sebelius [and] tell her it’s wrong for her and the Administration to 
trample the most basic American right.”281 
Why?  According these Commissioners, all three advertisements 
discuss the executive branch, which consists of many agencies and 
officials who are not candidates for reelection.282  They argue that the 
definition of “clearly identified” does not include use of audio of a 
candidate’s voice and, therefore, absent permissible reference to the 
speaker, a recording of a candidate’s voice does not clearly identify 
the candidate.283  These Commissioners also maintain that reaching an 
alternative conclusion regarding the terms “administration” and 
“White House” would lead to an absurd result, transforming ads 
exhorting viewers to contact their representatives to support the 
administration on legislative issues into express advocacy.284 
Commissioners Weintraub, Walther and Bauerly would reach the 
opposite result.285  According to these Commissioners, Congress, in 
enacting the BCRA, “intended to broaden the reach of the Act 
beyond communications that contain express advocacy or its 
functional equivalent.”286  They argue that references to the 
Administration” are “merely short-hand” for the President.287  In 
addition, they maintain that the contention that some listeners might 
not recognize a candidate’s voice is “highly improbable” given that 
the President’s voice is “widely recognized” and is also irrelevant 
because the analysis is supposed to be objective.288  Furthermore, they 
contend that any ambiguity caused by the third advertisement’s 
reference to Secretary Sebelius is clarified by the footage of the 
White House.289 
 
 281. Id. at 7. 
 282. Id. at 5–9. 
 283. See id. at 6–7. 
 284. Id. at 5–6 (arguing that, finding that “Administration” of “White House” 
referred to a clearly identified candidate, would mean that, advertisements stating: 
“Support the White House” would constitute in determining express advocacy since 
they combine one of Buckley’s magic words with a reference to a clearly identified 
candidate). 
 285. See Am. Future Fund, A.O. 2012-19 Draft B, at 3 (Fed. Election Comm’n 
June 7, 2012). 
 286. Am. Future Fund, Concurring Statement on A.O. Request 2012-19, at 1 (Fed. 
Election Comm’n June 13, 2012). 
 287. American Future Fund, A.O. 2012-19 Draft B, at 4–6. 
 288. Id. at 6; see also Am. Future Fund, Concurring Statement on A.O. Request 
2012-19, at 1–2 (Fed. Election Comm’n June 13, 2012). 
 289. See American Future Fund, A.O. 2012-19 Draft B, at 8. 
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The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reviewed 
advertisements that were “essentially identical” to those reviewed by 
the FEC and came to a different conclusion—that the first and third 
advertisements were ECs, but that the second advertisement was 
not.290  The court looked to the references that were made in the 
context of the advertisement as a whole291 and found that references 
to the White House and Administration, while discussing the policies 
of the current President and displaying images of the White House, 
were “clear[ly] . . . being used as synonyms for the President,” and, 
thus, unambiguous references to the current President.292  Concerning 
the third advertisement, the court found that the use of the term 
Administration, while displaying footage of the White House, 
distinguished the Secretary from the Administration, making it clear 
to viewers that Administration referred to the President.293  The court 
found that the second advertisement was not an EC because there 
was no evidence presented that “the average listener would recognize 
the President’s voice simply by hearing an eight word sentence.”294 
c. Determining When an Organization Qualifies as a PAC 
’Because the Commissioners do not agree on the proper definition 
of express advocacy, they are at odds over when exactly an 
organization exceeds the threshold spending amount under the first 
prong of the test for determining when an organization qualifies as a 
PAC.295  Even where the Commissioners agree that a group has met 
the threshold requirement, they disagree over the proper test for 
determining whether the major purpose of an organization is the 
nomination or defeat of a Federal candidate (the second prong). 
Commissioners McGahn, Peterson, and Hunter contend that the 
other commissioners’ interpretation of the major purpose test 
unconstitutionally exceeds the scope of the test as it was articulated in 
 
 290. Hispanic Leadership Fund v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 1:12CV893, 2012 
WL 4759238, at *13 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2012). 
 291. Id. at 13–15. 
 292. Id. at 13. 
 293. Id. at 14 (explaining that it is the President who “is the head of the 
Administration and [] resides, and works, at the White House”). 
 294. Id. 
 295. Compare Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft A, at 50–52 (Fed. Election 
Comm’n Apr. 12, 2012), with Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft B, at 22 (Fed. 
Election Comm’n Apr. 12, 2012).  The first prong for determining whether to impose 
PAC status is whether a group makes contributions or expenditures aggregating in 
excess of $1000 during a calendar year. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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Buckley.296  Commissioner McGahn argues that the FEC 
impermissibly considers a group’s overall federal campaign activity 
and its influence on federal elections.297  McGahn maintains that, by 
refusing to promulgate a list of factors, the agency allows itself to 
engage in the same sort of “intricate case-by-case determination” that 
the Supreme Court rejected in Wisconsin II and Citizens United.298 
These Commissioners believe that a group meets the major 
purpose standard in only two situations.299  First, a group must register 
as a PAC if its “central organizational purpose” is the election or 
defeat of federal candidates.300  In determining a group’s central 
purpose, the agency’s review should be limited to “official 
statements, . . . organizing documents or statement of purpose, or 
other materials put forth under the group’s name, including 
fundraising documents or press releases. . . .”301  According to these 
commissioners, prohibitions on express advocacy in a group’s bylaws 
in conjunction with an official statement that the group “promotes 
and protects free speech, limited government, and constitutional 
accountability” constitutes “clear evidence of intent to focus on issues 
and avoid electoral speech.”302 
Second, a group qualifies as a PAC if it devotes more than half of 
its spending to express advocacy.303  These three Commissioners 
maintain that, in determining the proportion of overall spending that 
 
 296. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 240, at 23–24 n.71.  These three 
Commissioners also argue that a case-by-case approach to ascertain PAC status fails 
to give “practical guidance” to those wishing to comply with disclosure requirements, 
and leaves speakers vulnerable to lengthy, burdensome investigations. Id.  
Additionally, they argue that this ex post approach fails to provide organizations with 
any way to determine when their first filing is due or what stretch of time the FEC 
will review to determine its major purpose. Id. 
 297. See MCGAHN, supra note 233, at 39.  McGahn argues that consideration of 
these factors violates the District Court of the District of Columbia’s holding in FEC 
v. GOPAC, which rejected the FEC’s argument that in order to meet the major 
purpose test, “an organization need not support the ‘nomination or election of a 
candidate,’ but need only engage in ‘partisan politics’ or ‘electoral activity.’” Id. 
(quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. GOPAC, 927 F. Supp. 851, 861 (D.D.C. 1996)). 
 298. Id. at 43. 
 299. This approach mirrors the one taken by the Tenth Circuit in construing a state 
statute. Cf. N.M. Youth Organized v. Hererra, 611 F.3d 669, 678 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 300. See Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft C, at 45 (Fed. Election Comm’n Apr. 26, 
2012). 
 301. Id. at 48.  These Commissioners believe that the FEC should not review 
outside sources such as news articles and other unofficial statements. Id. 
 302. Id. at 49. 
 303. See id. at 45. 
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is express advocacy, the FEC should not take into account ECs or 
other documents, such as faxes and fundraising letters, which are not 
express advocacy.304  Moreover, they argue that review should not be 
limited to short time periods that could provide an “incomplete 
picture” of a group’s central purpose.305 
Commissioners Weintraub, Walther, and Bauerly believe that the 
FEC is acting within its proper authority by taking a comprehensive 
approach to determining major purpose status.306  In Buckley, the 
Supreme Court articulated that the test was whether the group’s 
major purpose is “the nomination or election of a candidate.”307  Since 
then, the Court has not narrowed that definition or attempted to 
delineate exactly what the FEC may consider when applying the 
test.308  At a minimum, by later explaining that the “major purpose 
may be regarded as campaign activity” or whether its “primary 
objective is to influence political campaigns,” the Court signaled that 
the test was not static.309  In fact, every court that has considered the 
validity of the FEC’s multi-factor approach has upheld it.310 
Proponents of the multi-factor approach maintain that it makes 
sense from a policy perspective.  They argue that disclosure that is 
both effective and comprehensive is now even more paramount given 
that individuals and entities can spend an unlimited amount of money 
 
 304. Id. at 51 (noting that the legislative history of the BCRA indicates that 
members of Congress believed that organizations would be free to run ECs without 
having to register and report as a PAC (citing 147 CONG. REC. S2813 (daily ed. Mar. 
27, 2001) (statement of Sen. James Jeffords)). 
 305. Id. at 50 n.30.  The Commissioners provided a hypothetical of a group that is 
created in the middle of an election year and, thus, is primarily focused on election 
related activities, but that intends to remain in existence after the election to focus on 
non-election related activities. Id. 
 306. See Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft B, at 15–17 (Fed. Election 
Comm’n Aug. 23, 2012). 
 307. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976). 
 308. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986); see 
also Brief for Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21 as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 29, Free Speech v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 2:1200127 (D. Wyo. 
Oct. 3, 2012) (noting that the court in Shays v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 511 F. Supp. 
2d 19 (D.D.C. 2007), approved the FEC’s approach and noted that “Buckley 
established the major purpose test, but did not describe its application in any 
fashion”), appeal docketed No. 12-8078 (10th Cir. Oct. 19, 2013). 
 309. See Mass. Citizens, 479 U.S. at 262. 
 310. See Brief for Campaign Legal Center, supra note 308, at 28–29 (discussing 
Real Truth About Abortion v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544, 558 (4th Cir. 
2012), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 841 (2013); Shays, 511 F. Supp. 2d 19; and Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Malenick, 310 F. Supp. 2d. 230, 234 (D.D.C. 2004)). 
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on campaign related activity.311  Moreover, such an approach does not 
risk chilling speech in the same way that it did when the Supreme 
Court first created it, since it no longer acts to ban or limit speech.312 
In carrying out a multi-factor approach, Commissioners Weintraub, 
Walther, and Bauerly consider a group’s “overall conduct,” including: 
statements about its mission, the proportion of spending related to 
federal candidate campaigns, and the extent to which fundraising 
solicitations indicate funds provided will be used to support or oppose 
specific candidates.313  The Commissioners compare the proportion of 
spending on federal campaign activity (which is not limited to express 
advocacy) with a group’s spending on activities that are not 
campaign-related.314 
d. The Ensuing Effects on Disclosure 
The effect of these Commissioners’ 3-3 splits is that the FEC lacks 
the requisite votes to take action in any circumstance that falls 
outside of the more narrow approach that Commissioners McGahn, 
Peterson, and Hunter take.  Thus, communications by non-PAC 
organizations that do not use the magic words, or, when aired within 
the relevant period before an election, do not refer to a candidate by 
explicitly naming or displaying a picture of the candidate, will not be 
required to disclose the sources of their contributions.  Moreover, so 
long as a group does not spend more than half of its money on 
express advocacy (as narrowly defined by three of the 
Commissioners) during the more extended time frame that those 
Commissioners are likely to consider, it does not have to register as a 
PAC, and thus will not be subject to more stringent disclosure 
requirements.315 
If an organization that seeks an advisory opinion from the FEC to 
determine whether a proposed advertisement is express advocacy or 
an EC, or whether it needs to register as a PAC, does not receive an 
answer because the FEC lacks the requisite votes to issue an opinion, 
 
 311. See Brief of Appellee Federal Election Commission at 41–42, Free Speech v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 12-8078 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2013). 
 312. See id. at 43 (citing Real Truth, 681 F.3d at 549). 
 313. Political Comm. Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 5595, 5597, 5605 (Feb. 7, 2007) (to be 
codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 314. See Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft B, at 25–28 (Fed. Election Comm’n Apr. 
12, 2012) (citing Political Comm. Status, 72 Fed. Reg. at 5601, 5605). 
 315. See Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft C, at 55 (Fed. Election Comm’n Apr. 26, 
2012). 
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it has two options.  The first option for the organization is to continue 
its planned activity without adhering to disclosure or reporting 
requirements, knowing that the FEC currently lacks the requisite 
votes to bring an enforcement proceeding against it.316  If an 
individual decides to challenge the organization for non-compliance 
with its enabling statute, he first will have to file a complaint with the 
FEC.317  Assuming that none of the Commissioners have changed 
their viewpoints and that none of the members have been replaced, 
the Commission will likely deadlock on whether the committee 
violated the FECA, which will result in a dismissal of the complaint.318  
The challenger can then dispute the Commission’s dismissal by filing 
a petition with the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.319  The District Court then will request a statement from 
the three Commissioners who voted to dismiss the complaint 
providing their reasons for dismissal.320  The court will defer to the 
three dissenting Commissioner’s decision unless it determines that the 
agency’s action was “contrary to law.”321 
The second option would be to seek a declaratory judgment from a 
court enjoining the FEC from bringing an enforcement proceeding 
against it in the future.322  The reviewing court will not defer to any of 
 
 316. Four votes are required for the FEC to act. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(c) (2006). 
 317. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1) (2006). 
 318. See Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 831 F.2d 
1131, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 319. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A); Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., 831 F.2d 
at 1133. 
 320. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d 
1471, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 321. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(C); see Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d at 
1476 (“Since [the dissenting Commissioners] constitute a controlling group for 
purposes of the decision, their rationale necessarily states the agency’s reasons for 
acting as it did.”).  A decision is “contrary to law” if it is the result of an 
“impermissible interpretation” of law or is otherwise “arbitrary or capricious or an 
abuse of discretion.” Orloski v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 795 F.2d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 
1986). 
 322. See Hispanic Leadership Fund v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 1:12CV893, 
2012 WL 4759238, at *1–2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2012) (finding that plaintiff had standing 
to seek declaratory judgment that its planned advertisements would not constitute 
ECs after the FEC deadlocked and, thus, failed to issue an advisory opinion 
regarding another committee’s advertisements that were “essentially identical” to the 
plaintiff’s proposed advertisements); Carey v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 791 F. Supp. 2d 
121, 125, 132–33 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding committee had standing to seek a 
preliminary injunction to enjoin the FEC from enforcing provisions of the FECA 
against it for its planned campaign activity after the FEC deadlocked and, thus, failed 
to issue an advisory opinion regarding its planned activity). 
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the Commissioner’s opinions, however, since the agency’s deadlock 
over issuing an advisory opinion constitutes a final agency action.323  
Thus, under this option, the organization will spend additional legal 
fees obtaining a judgment that will not defer to those Commissioners 
who believe that the proposed speech does not fall within one of the 
regulable categories. 
III.  STATE ATTEMPTS TO GO BEYOND THE FEDERAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
Recognizing that the federal disclosure laws are unable to provide 
meaningful disclosure, several states have enacted laws requiring 
more extensive disclosure and reporting.324  States arguably have a 
stronger interest than the federal government in requiring 
disclosure.325  The Supreme Court has recognized that the Guarantee 
Clause of the Constitution gives states broad power to define their 
electorates.326  It follows, then, that states have the power, within the 
confines of the Constitution, to regulate the influence of outside 
groups on state election results.327 
States and local municipalities are more vulnerable to the influence 
of large factions than the federal government.328  Overall spending on 
local election campaigns is generally much more limited than 
spending on federal elections and, thus, outside groups spending large 
amounts can influence election results more easily.329  Accordingly, a 
 
 323. See Hispanic Leadership Fund, No. 1:12CV893, 2012 WL 4759238, at *12 
(finding no deference where FEC split 3-3 on whether to issue an advisory opinion). 
 324. See Tara Malloy, A New Transparency: How to Ensure Disclosure from 
“Mixed-Purpose” Groups After Citizens United, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 425, 449 (2011). 
 325. See Patrick M. Garry et al., Raising the Question of Whether Out-of-State 
Political Contributions May Affect A Small State’s Political Autonomy: A Case 
Study of the South Dakota Voter Referendum on Abortion, 55 S.D. L. REV. 35, 40 
(2010). 
 326. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: 
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 37 (1988). 
 327. Cf. id. at 38 (noting the courts can affirm state control over state and local 
election franchises by recognizing that this power is one aspect of republican 
government promised to the states by the Guarantee Clause). 
 328. See Johnstone, supra note 37, at 466. 
 329. See Garry et al., supra note 325, at 40 n.32; Shane Goldmacher, Does Money 
Talk in Congress? In 2012, It Screamed, NAT’L J. (Nov. 10, 2012, 9:43 PM), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/does-money-talk-in-congress-in-2012-it-
screamed-20121108; Lauren Feeney, Dark Money in State and Local Elections, BILL 
MOYERS WEEKLY Q&A (June 15, 2012), http://billmoyers.com/2012/06/15/dark-
money-in-state-and-local-elections (discussing how a local federal candidate lost an 
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state’s citizens have a strong interest in knowing the extent of outside 
spending’s influence.  Outside spending that influences elections also 
undermines the principles of horizontal federalism and state 
sovereignty.330  Outside influence can interfere with states’ abilities to 
serve as laboratories of experimentation and undercuts the notion 
that the people vote with their feet.331  Increased outside spending can 
also undermine constituents’ beliefs that state elected officials are 
more likely to be responsive to their needs.332 
A. Determining What the Supreme Court Said 
Although they are few and far outnumbered, some courts have 
concluded that Buckley’s narrowing of certain provisions of the 
FECA was constitutionally required.  Courts that have invalidated 
state laws that failed to adopt the Supreme Court’s limiting 
interpretation of several provisions of the FECA engaged in little if 
no substantive analysis of whether the state law met exacting scrutiny. 
1. The Major Purpose Test 
The federal “major purpose” test has created some odd results, 
such as permitting large organizations that spend millions of dollars 
on campaign-related activity to avoid being subject to the additional 
PAC disclosure requirements just by ensuring that the organization’s 
major purpose is not to nominate or elect a federal candidate.333  
States, in an attempt to avoid similar results, have enacted laws that 
either completely do away with the major purpose test or define 
“major purpose” more broadly than federal law does. 
In some instances, courts have read the major purpose test into 
these statutes, insisting that it is necessary to avoid vagueness 
concerns.  In North Carolina Right to Life v. Leake, the Fourth 
Circuit found that a state law imposing PAC status on any group that 
“[h]as as a major purpose to support or oppose the nomination or 
 
election where he had previously had a twelve-point lead after an outside group spent 
$400,000 in the final days of the election campaign). 
 330. See Garry et al., supra note 325, at 46; see also Michael S. Greve, Federalism’s 
Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93, 99 (2002) (“Federalism rests on principles of state 
autonomy and equality: each state governs its own territory and citizens but not, of 
course, the territory and citizens of sister states.”). 
 331. See Garry et al., supra note 325, at 36–38. 
 332. See id. 
 333. See Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012). 
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election of one or more clearly identified candidates” was vague.334  
The court reasoned that there could be only one purpose that was 
“the major purpose” of an organization under Buckley’s construction, 
whereas there could be several purposes that simultaneously could 
constitute “a major purpose” of an organization under the state law.335  
The court reasoned that, in the absence of any criteria as to when a 
“purpose” becomes “a major purpose,” organizations lacked 
sufficient notice as to when they could be designated as a PAC.336  
The Tenth Circuit also read the major purpose requirement into two 
state laws—one imposed PAC status on organizations that “operate 
primarily” for a political purpose,337 and a second imposed PAC status 
on “any group that spends more than $200 a year to support or 
oppose the nomination or election of one or more candidates.”338 
Other circuits have refused to invalidate or narrowly construe laws 
on vagueness grounds merely because they fail to use “the major 
purpose” test to determine PAC status.  The Ninth Circuit upheld a 
law imposing PAC status on a group “if one of its primary purposes is 
to affect governmental decision-making by supporting or opposing 
candidates or ballot propositions, and it makes or expects to make 
contributions in support of or in opposition to a candidate or ballot 
measure” against a vagueness challenge, reasoning that the test 
provided “concrete, discernible criteria.”339  Other courts have upheld 
state laws imposing PAC status once a group’s total amount of 
expenditures or contributions exceeds a certain amount.340 
State laws that alter or do away with the federal test for 
determining PAC status have also been challenged on First 
Amendment grounds.  Lower courts are divided over whether a 
 
 334. N.C. Right to Life v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 323 (4th Cir. 2008).  Note, however, 
that organizations that met the state’s requirements were subject to both disclosure 
requirements and limits on the amount of contributions they could receive. See Real 
Truth About Abortion v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544, 553 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 335. Leake, 525 F.3d at 289 (explaining how a single organization could have 
multiple purposes). 
 336. Id. at 290 (noting that the statute’s vagueness made it susceptible to abuse by 
granting regulators’ broad, unguided discretion). 
 337. N.M. Youth Org. v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 677 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-19-26(L)) (upholding as-applied challenge). 
 338. Colo. Right to Life Comm. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1152 (10th Cir. 2007).  
In Coffman, the law at issue both imposed strict contributions and disclosure 
requirements. See Malloy, supra note 324, at 448 (footnote omitted) (citation 
omitted). 
 339. Human Life of Wash. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 340. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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“major purpose” is constitutionally required under the First 
Amendment and, if so, what constitutes a major purpose.  Some 
courts have read the “major purpose” test into state laws, finding that 
without such a requirement, the laws run the risk of sweeping in a 
substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech.341 
Most courts, however, have dismissed such challenges, finding that 
such laws are not overly broad merely because they impose PAC 
status on organizations whose major purpose is not influencing 
elections.  Courts rely on three primary justifications for upholding 
such laws.  First, courts reason that the major purpose limitation that 
Buckley created, like the “magic words” test, was a product of 
statutory interpretation.342  Second, courts distinguish state laws that 
deal purely with disclosure from the provision in Buckley, which 
placed hard limits on the amount that individuals could contribute to 
PACs and the sources from which PACs could receive contributions 
in addition to disclosure requirements.343  They point to the Supreme 
Court’s indication in Massachusetts Citizens for Life that, although 
exempt from the limit on use of general treasury funds, an 
organization would be subject to the FECA’s more extensive 
disclosure requirements for PACs if its independent spending became 
such that it was deemed to have as its major purpose the election or 
defeat of a candidate.344  Thus, courts reason that although the major 
purpose test may be required for laws imposing hard limits on 
campaign contributions and expenditures, it is not mandated for laws 
triggering additional disclosure requirements.345 
Third, courts acknowledge that the major purpose test “yields 
perverse results” by requiring small groups with limited spending to 
register, while exempting larger groups that spend far more on 
 
 341. See Herrera, 611 F.3d at 677 (interpreting law requiring organizations that 
“operate primarily” for the purpose of “influencing or attempting to influence an 
election” to register as PACs as requiring that such organizations meet the major 
purpose test as it was articulated in Buckley); Leake, 525 F.3d at 288–89.  The law in 
Leake, however, was distinguishable from the other state laws that failed to adopt the 
federal standard. See Malloy, supra note 324. 
 342. See Madigan, 697 F.3d at 486–89 (7th Cir. 2012); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. 
McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012); 
Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1009–10; Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 
376, 394 (D. Vt. 2012). 
 343. See, e.g., Madigan, 697 F.3d at 488 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35 
(1974)). 
 344. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986). 
 345. See Madigan 697 F.3d at 488; Malloy, supra note 324, at 446–49. 
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campaign-related activities.346  Courts recognize that limiting PAC 
status to those groups that have “the major purpose of influencing 
elections” would allow large groups to circumvent the law with ease 
by either increasing non-campaign-related activities or by merging 
with an organization that is not engaged in campaign-related 
activities.347 
2. Express Advocacy and Its Functional Equivalent 
Several states, in an attempt to avoid creating easily exploitable 
bright-line distinctions between regulable and non-regulable speech, 
have enacted laws compelling disclosure of communications 
containing speech that would fall outside of Buckley’s “magic words” 
test.  Courts that have reviewed such laws can be separated into three 
categories, ranging from least to most permissive.348  In the first 
category, at least one court has found that a state law imposing 
disclosure requirements on groups making expenditures for anything 
other than express advocacy (as it was interpreted in Buckley) or ECs 
(as they are defined in the FECA) was impermissibly vague.349  In the 
second category are courts that have upheld disclosure requirements 
for speech that meets the federal express advocacy requirements 
found in § 100.22(a) and (b) against constitutional challenges.350  Also 
in this category is one court that found that state disclosure 
requirements for speech that is express advocacy or its functional 
equivalent (as it was defined in Wisconsin II) were constitutional 
even though the regulations were not further limited in the same ways 
as the federal provision.351 
In the final category are courts that have upheld language that is 
arguably broader than the language found in § 100.22(b) and the 
 
 346. Madigan, 697 F.3d at 489 (quoting McKee, 649 F.3d at 59). 
 347. Id. at 489–90. 
 348. Since these cases involve situations where courts have either upheld 
provisions or narrowed them in order to avoid vagueness concerns, however, they do 
not hold that any additional disclosure extending beyond the courts’ interpretation 
would be unconstitutional. See supra notes 89, 269 and accompanying text. 
 349. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 664 (5th Cir. 
2006); N.C. Right to Life v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008). But see Real Truth 
About Abortion v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544, 553 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(distinguishing Leake on the grounds that the law at issue imposed not just 
disclosure, but also limits on contributions and expenditures). 
 350. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom, v. Tennant, 706 F.3d 270, 280–81 (2013). 
 351. Yamada v. Weaver, 872 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1045 (D. Haw. 2012) (indicating 
that it was not clear that such a narrow reading was necessary). 
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“appeal to vote” test.  In State of Vermont v. Green Mountain 
Future, the Vermont District Court narrowed the term “influence” to 
mean “supporting or opposing one or more candidates.”352  Similarly, 
in National Organization for Marriage v. McKee, the First Circuit 
upheld the terms “support,” “oppose,” and “opposition,” which 
appeared in several disclosure provisions.353 
Although courts have been nearly unanimous in upholding such 
terms, it remains unclear whether they are in fact vague, especially 
when they are considered in the context of whole provisions.354  
Lower courts upholding such language rely on McConnell, where the 
Supreme Court, in a footnote, upheld a provision defining “public 
communication” as a communication that “refers to a clearly 
identified candidate for Federal office . . . and that promotes or 
supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate 
for that office.”355  That provision was more limited than some of the 
state provisions, however, in that it required that the communication 
“refer to a clearly identified candidate”356 and it applied only to state 
party committees, whose actions are presumed to be coordinated with 
federal candidates.357 
State laws going beyond the federal requirements have also been 
challenged on First Amendment grounds.  Such challenges, however, 
have been largely unsuccessful.358  While the Supreme Court has only 
 
 352. Vermont v. Green Mountain Future, No. 758-10-10, at 2–3 (Sup. Ct. Vt. June 
28, 2011), available at http://www.vermontjudiciary.org/20112015%20 
Tcdecisioncvl/2011-6-30-1.pdf (defining “PACs” as any entity receiving contributions 
or making expenditures over a threshold amount “for the purpose of supporting or 
opposing one or more candidates, influencing an election, or advocating a position on 
a public question in any election or affecting the outcome of an election.”). 
 353. Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 62–63 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012). 
 354. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 332 (1988) (finding the term “peace” 
was not vague as its definition was apparent from its context); see also Thomas v. 
Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S. 568, 593 (1985) (“A term that appears vague 
on its face may derive much meaningful content from the purpose of the Act, its 
factual background, and the statutory context.”). 
 355. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 184 (2003). 
 356. 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iii) (2006). 
 357. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 503–04 (7th Cir. 
2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (explaining that the provision upheld in McConnell was 
not vague).  Judge Posner indicated that intent-based limitations, such as regulating 
speech “made for the purpose of influencing,” promoting, opposing, etc., might be 
sufficient to allow the provision to pass muster. Id. (emphasis added). 
 358. See Madigan, 697 F.3d at 484 n.17 (finding that “with just one exception every 
circuit that has reviewed First Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements 
since Citizens United has concluded that such laws may constitutionally cover more 
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addressed whether “express advocacy” and “electioneering 
communications” as they are defined by the FECA are valid, it has 
never indicated that regulations may go no further.359 
B. Determining What Exactly Is Exacting Scrutiny 
Courts reviewing state laws that require disclosure of activities not 
addressed by the Supreme Court are forced to undergo a more 
substantive analysis to determine and apply the appropriate standard 
of review.  A frequent challenge to state disclosure requirements is 
that they are so burdensome that they act as a de facto ban on speech 
and, thus, should be reviewed under strict scrutiny.360  Challengers 
argue that the Supreme Court indicated in Citizens United that strict 
scrutiny review was appropriate for laws that are “expensive to 
administer and subject to extensive regulations,” such as those that 
require an organization to appoint a treasurer, maintain detailed 
records, and promptly file statements when information changes.361 
Thus far, courts unanimously have rejected such attempts for two 
reasons.362  First, lower courts are bound by the Supreme Court,363 
which has held repeatedly that exacting scrutiny is the appropriate 
level of review for disclosure laws.364  Second, the burdens that the 
FECA imposed on corporations prior to Citizens United included 
 
than just express advocacy and its functional equivalents”).  The exception—the 10th 
Circuit—invalidated disclosure requirements as applied to certain organizations. Id. 
(discussing Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010) and N.M. Youth 
Org. v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 677 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010)). 
 359. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Tennant, 849 F. Supp. 2d 659, 684–85 
(S.D.W. Va. 2011), overruled on other grounds, 706 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 360. See Malloy, supra note 324, at 446. 
 361. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 337–38 (2010). 
 362. See SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 695–96 (D.C. Cir. 
2010); Iowa Right to Life Comm. v. Tooker, 795 F. Supp. 2d 852, 865–67 (S.D. Iowa 
2011); ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F. Supp. 2d 914, 936 (E.D. Cal. 2011); 
Yamada v. Kuramoto, No. 10-00497, 2010 WL 4603936, at *10 (D. Haw. Oct. 29, 
2010). 
 363. Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 1307, 1308 (2012). 
 364. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67; McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
540 U.S. 93, 231–32 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 66, 96 (1976).  The Eighth Circuit, however, indicated that it 
did not believe that the Supreme Court intended exacting scrutiny to apply to 
burdensome disclosure laws. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 
864, 874–75 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). But see id. at 881 (Melloy, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that applying strict scrutiny to burdensome disclosure laws is “circular and 
conclusory . . . requir[ing] a court to assess the burden of a disclosure law to 
determine what level of scrutiny applies, then to evaluate that burden again under 
exacting or strict scrutiny”). 
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requirements that they create a separate association in order to speak 
and placed limits on the types of sources that could contribute to the 
separate association.365 
While disclosure requirements generally are reviewed under 
exacting scrutiny, the Court in Buckley indicated that monetary 
thresholds triggering disclosure should be reviewed under rational 
basis.366  As a result, some courts have reviewed thresholds separately 
under rational basis.367  Three circuits have rejected this 
interpretation, however, choosing instead to review thresholds under 
exacting scrutiny.368 
Although courts generally agree that exacting scrutiny is the 
appropriate standard of review for disclosure requirements,369 they do 
not agree completely as to what the standard requires.370  The 
“exacting” standard was first articulated by the Court in United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.,371 long before the Court first 
articulated the “strict scrutiny” standard of review.372  Unlike strict 
scrutiny and rational basis, exacting scrutiny does not presume the 
 
 365. See Swanson, 692 F.3d at 881 (Melloy, J., dissenting). 
 366. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 83 (finding that thresholds for record-keeping and 
reporting were not “wholly without rationality”). 
 367. See Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Daluz, 654 F.3d 115, 118–19 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(applying rational basis); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 60–61 (1st 
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012); Daggett v. Comm’n on Gov’t Ethics & 
Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 466 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying rational basis); Vt. 
Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 376 (D. Vt. 2012) (same); Bowen, 830 
F. Supp. 2d at 944–45 (same). But cf. Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 809 & 
n.7 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying exacting scrutiny to uphold $25 and $100 thresholds, 
noting, “[i]t is far from clear, however, that even a zero-dollar disclosure threshold 
would succumb to exacting scrutiny” and that “we are not aware of any decision 
invalidating a contribution disclosure requirement, either facially or as applied to a 
particular actor”). 
 368. See Swanson, 692 F.3d at 876; McKenna, 685 F.3d at 809; Canyon Ferry Rd. 
Baptist Church of E. Helena v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009); see 
also Iowa Right to Life Comm. v. Tooker, 795 F. Supp. 2d 852, 866 (S.D. Iowa 2011) 
(stating that the disclosure provisions must be evaluated “as a whole”). 
 369. See Swanson, 692 F.3d at 881 (Melloy, J., dissenting) (describing the view held 
by six members of the Eighth Circuit that the Supreme Court never intended that 
exacting scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review for all disclosure laws). 
 370. James Bopp, Jr. & Josiah Neeley, How Not to Reform Judicial Elections: 
Davis, White, & the Future of Judicial Campaign Financing, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 195, 
225 (2008). 
 371. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. 
 372. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and 
Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 361 (2006) (discussing the birth of strict 
scrutiny). 
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law to be either constitutional or unconstitutional.373  Rather, exacting 
scrutiny occupies the amorphous territory between the two clearer 
standards.  Perhaps in part due to the nature of the territory that it 
occupies, for many years the standard was described or applied in a 
consistent manner.374  The Supreme Court has referred to exacting 
scrutiny as “the most exacting scrutiny,”375 “critical scrutiny,”376 a 
“strict test,”377 and “the strictest standard of review.”378  In some cases, 
the test has been described as being akin to strict scrutiny in that it 
requires a “compelling interest” and the “least restrictive means.”379  
More recently, the Court clarified the standard, explaining that the 
test requires a “sufficiently important governmental interest” and a 
“substantial relation” between the disclosure requirement and that 
interest.380 
Since the Supreme Court clarified the standard for exacting 
scrutiny, lower courts have stated the correct standard consistently.381  
In applying the standard, however, lower courts take divergent 
approaches.  These courts vary as to what evidence the government 
must provide, if any, to show that the law is “substantially related” to 
a “sufficiently important interest.” 
Some courts have construed the Supreme Court’s assertions that 
the burden is on the government to show that the interest advanced is 
“paramount”382 and “reflect[s] the seriousness of the actual burden on 
 
 373. Johnstone, supra note 37, at 419–20. 
 374. Bopp & Neeley, supra note 370, at 225–26; see Minn. Citizens Concerned for 
Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 304, 876 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 375. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2548 (2012) (plurality) (quoting 
Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994)). 
 376. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786–87 (1978). 
 377. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976). 
 378. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347–48 (1995). 
 379. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549, 2551. 
 380. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010); accord 
Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010). 
 381. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Tennant, 706 F.3d 270, 282 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(exacting scrutiny requires a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement 
and a sufficiently important governmental interest); Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. 
Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 477 (7th Cir. 2012) (same); Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life 
v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 874–75 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (same); Family PAC v. 
McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2011) (same); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. 
Daluz, 654 F.3d 115, 118 (1st Cir. 2011) (same); SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (same). 
 382. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976). 
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First Amendment rights”383 to mean that review of the government’s 
justifications and the nexus between that interest and the disclosure 
requirements is necessary.  Other courts take a more deferential 
approach, relying on the Supreme Court’s finding in Citizens United, 
that the informational interest alone was sufficient in finding that 
local governments have an important interest in compelling 
disclosure. 
With one exception, the standard that courts apply when reviewing 
monetary thresholds appears to have little effect on the outcome.  
Applying rational basis, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a zero-dollar 
threshold reporting requirement for organizations, reasoning that 
“the value of th[e] financial information to the voters declines 
drastically as the value of the expenditure or contribution sinks to a 
negligible level.”384  Two years later, applying exacting scrutiny, the 
Ninth Circuit upheld $25 and $100 threshold disclosure thresholds, 
noting that “[i]t [wa]s far from clear . . . that even a zero-dollar 
disclosure threshold” would fail to meet the standard.385  The court 
reasoned, “small contributions [could] provide useful information to 
voters when considered in the aggregate.”386  A district court in the 
Second Circuit applied rational basis, but indicated that exacting 
scrutiny would “make little difference in the Court’s analysis of th[e] 
disclosure threshold.”387  The sole exception, the Eighth Circuit, took 
a less deferential approach to a $100 reporting and disclosure 
 
 383. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008) (citing Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68, 71 (1976)). 
 384. Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 
1033–34 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding Montana’s “zero dollar” reporting threshold “wholly 
without rationality” because “[a]s a matter of common sense, the value of this 
financial information to the voters declines drastically as the value of the expenditure 
or contribution sinks to a negligible level” (emphasis omitted)); see also Sampson v. 
Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1261 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding $20 threshold for reporting 
contributors’ names and addresses and $100 threshold for reporting names, 
addresses, occupations, and employers were invalid under rational basis). 
 385. Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 809 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2011).  The Court 
distinguished the contribution disclosure threshold from the reporting thresholds in 
Canyon Ferry and Sampson. Id. at 810 & n.10. 
 386. Id. at 810. 
 387. Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 376, 400–01 (D. Vt. 2012) 
(citing McKenna, 685 F.3d at 809 & n.7).  The court found that the law had a 
“rational foundation” because its threshold was higher than that of twenty-eight 
other states and lower than that of only five states and the federal government, and 
that the law was not arrived at haphazardly because “the legislative history 
reflect[ed] a concerted effort to adjust the amount over the years” and the lower 
amount permitted transparency of considerably more contributions than a higher 
amount would. Id. at 401. 
EAGAN_AUTHOR APPROVAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2013  7:25 PM 
2012] DARK MONEY RISES 855 
threshold, scrutinizing the additional burdens that the low threshold 
amount imposed on speakers.388 
1. Expanding the Definition of Electioneering Communications 
State attempts to broaden the definition of ECs beyond the 
requirements of federal law have received mixed reception in courts.  
Courts disagree as to whether the government interests that the 
Supreme Court recognized in Buckley and subsequent cases apply to 
state laws that regulate more types of speech than the federal 
provisions do and what, if anything, the government must show to 
establish that the means are sufficiently tailored to those interests.   
Courts in the Second and Eleventh Circuits have upheld such laws 
without requiring any showing by the government that an important 
interest was substantially related to the communications.389  For 
example, in National Organization for Marriage v. Roberts, the 
District Court upheld an electioneering communication disclosure 
requirement that included newspapers, magazines, direct mail, and 
telephone calls even though the only evidence offered in support of 
the regulation was an article in a local newspaper describing the “no 
holds-barred political brawl” that occurred during a period following 
a court’s invalidation of the prior EC provisions.390 
The Courts of Appeals in the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have 
taken less deferential approaches.  In Center for Individual Freedom 
v. Madigan, the Seventh Circuit upheld a state law including Internet 
speech within its definition of ECs, but only after noting that there 
was information in the record indicating that the major parties’ 
spending on online communications in 2012 was expected to increase 
 
 388. See Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 871–72 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 389. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 381, 390–91, 397–400 (ECs included items like 
billboards, posters, pamphlets, and robotic phone calls); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. 
Roberts, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1219 (N.D. Fla. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Org. for 
Marriage v. Sec’y, State of Fla., 477 F. App’x 584 (11th Cir. 2012) (ECs included 
newspapers, magazines, direct mail, and telephone calls).  In Sorrell, the district court 
found that the laws were properly tailored and the burdens (requiring the sponsor to 
send the Secretary a one-page form and then provide a photocopy of the report to 
any candidates who appeared in the activity) were minimal. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 
at 398. 
 390. See Defendant’s Memo in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 1–2, Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Roberts, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (N.D. Fla. 
2010) (No. 1:10-cv-00192-SPM-GRJ), 2010 WL 4632649.  The court made no 
reference to any legislative findings, nor were any provided by counsel. See generally 
Roberts, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1217. 
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sevenfold from the prior election,391 and that in 2008, more than half 
of the voting-age population went online to get involved in or learn 
about the Presidential campaign.392 
In Center for Individual Freedom v. Tennant, the Fourth Circuit 
took a less deferential approach than the Seventh Circuit when it 
struck down part of a state law expanding the definition of ECs to 
include “materials published in any newspaper, magazine, or other 
periodical.”393  The court found that the state could rely on the 
informational interest as it was articulated in Buckley to justify 
regulating print communications.394  In determining whether the 
means were adequately tailored to the informational interest, the 
court looked to codified statements of the legislature’s intent as well 
as materials in the court’s record.395  The court found that the text of 
the statute and affidavits on the record “provide[d] ample support for 
including newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals [in the state’s 
EC] definition.”396  Moreover, the court found that regulating print 
communications furthered the state’s interest, regardless of how little 
money was actually spent on print ECs.397  Nevertheless, the court 
determined that the state had not provided any rationale for 
regulating some forms of non-broadcast media but not others such as 
direct mailings.398  Consequently, the court found the regulation was 
underinclusive and, thus, invalid.399 
 
 391. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 492 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(citing Jen Christensen, Obama Outspends Romney on Online Ads, CNN (June 3, 
2012, 11:20 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/03/politics/online-campaign-
spending/index.html). 
 392. See id. (citing Aaron Smith, The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008, PEW 
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.pewresearch.org/ 
pubs/1192/internet-politics-campaign-2008.aspx). 
 393. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Tennant, 706 F.3d 270, 283–85 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 394. Id. at 282–83. 
 395. See id. at 284–85.  The Court noted that there was “little, if any, formal 
legislative history.” Id. at n.4. 
 396. Id. at 284.  The court noted that “the statute explicitly mention[ed] the 
legislature’s fear that ‘[f]ailing to regulate non-broadcast media would permit those 
desiring to influence elections to avoid the principles and policies that are embodied 
in existing state law’” and that the “affidavits clearly support[ed] the informational 
purpose that the [state] legislature enunciated.” Id. 
 397. Id. at 284–85.  Information on the record revealed that as little as 0.4% of 
third-party spending financed print communications. Id. 
 398. Id. at 285. 
 399. Id.  Earlier versions of the statute included direct mailings, telephone banks, 
and billboard advertising, but the legislature had removed them following the District 
Court’s determination that the state could not regulate non-broadcast media.  The 
court acknowledged that the state legislature had likely removed those 
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2. PAC-Style Disclosure Requirements 
Several of the states that do not use a major purpose-style test to 
determine PAC status have opted instead to impose disclosure 
requirements similar to the federal PAC requirements on all 
organizations making contributions or expenditures exceeding a 
certain amount.400  The state laws, like the federal PAC disclosure 
laws, require organizations exceeding the threshold to register, name 
a treasurer, maintain records and file regular reports with the state 
agency charged with enforcement, and provide for penalties for non-
compliance.401  The laws differ from each other in the amount of 
spending that triggers the more extensive disclosure requirements, 
how long groups have to register, the extensiveness of the filing 
requirements, which donors groups must disclose, and the severity of 
the penalties for non-compliance.402 
With one exception, courts have upheld such laws against 
challenges that they are unduly burdensome and thus violative of the 
First Amendment.  The First Circuit upheld a state law setting a 
$5,000 threshold for imposing PAC status on groups receiving 
contributions or making expenditures for “the purpose of promoting, 
defeating or [expressly advocating or its functional equivalent for or 
against] the nomination or election of any candidate to political 
office.”403  Under the law, groups were required to register within 
seven days of exceeding the threshold amount.404  Once registered, 
groups were required to file six reports during election years and four 
reports during non-election years.405  The law required all groups 
 
communications from its EC definition to comply with a lower court’s order that had 
since been overruled. Id. 
 400. See Malloy, supra note 324, at 450 (explaining the PAC-style disclosure 
model). 
 401. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 471–72 (7th Cir. 
2012); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 42–43 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012); Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 
376, 380–81 (D. Vt. 2012). 
 402. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 471–72 (7th Cir. 
2012); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 42–43 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012); Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 
376, 380–81 (D. Vt. 2012). 
 403. McKee, 649 F.3d at 42.  Notably, the appellee did not challenge the 
substantive obligations attendant to non-major purpose PAC status or contest the 
registration, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements.  Rather, the appellee 
challenged the definition of a non-major purpose PAC. Id. at 58. 
 404. Id. at 42 (citing ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21–A, § 1053 (2011)). 
 405. Id. 
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exceeding the threshold to identify all contributors donating more 
than fifty dollars to support or oppose a candidate or campaign.406  
The law provided civil fines407 and criminal penalties ranging from 
fines to imprisonment of up to six months for non-compliance.408 
The Seventh Circuit upheld a state law setting a $3,000 threshold 
for imposing PAC status on groups and individuals receiving 
contributions or making expenditures on behalf of or in opposition to 
a candidate, or “in support of or in opposition to any question of 
public policy” to be submitted to the electors, or on ECs.409  Under 
the law, groups were required to register within two days of exceeding 
the threshold amount.410  Once registered, groups were required to 
file four reports annually disclosing the sources of all contributions 
and to file additional reports within a few days of receiving any 
contributions exceeding $1,000.411  The law provided civil fines and 
injunctions for non-compliance.412 
The district court for the District of Vermont upheld a state law 
setting a $500 threshold for imposing PAC status on any two or more 
individuals receiving contributions or making expenditures “for the 
purpose [of] . . . advocating a position on a public question, or 
supporting or opposing one or more candidates in any election.”413  
Under the law, groups were required to register within ten days of 
exceeding the threshold amount.414  Once registered, groups were 
required to file reports, up to six times during an election year and 
once during non-election years, disclosing the sources of all 
contributions exceeding $100.415  The law provided for civil fines, 
investigations, enforcement actions, and criminal penalties ranging 
from fines to imprisonment for up to six months for non-
compliance.416 
 
 406. Id. 
 407. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21–A, § 1062–A(1) (2011); tit. 21–A, § 1020–A(5–
A)(A); tit. 21–A, § 1014(4). 
 408. See tit. 21–A, § 1004; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17–A, § 1252 (2008). 
 409. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 497 & n.35, 480 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (citing 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9–8.6(a) (2012)). 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id. at 471–72. 
 412. Id. 
 413. Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 376, 380 (D. Vt. 2012). 
 414. Id. at 396. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id. at n.3. 
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In Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, the Eighth 
Circuit, the sole exception, reviewed a state law setting a $100 
threshold for imposing PAC status on any two or more individuals 
receiving contributions or making expenditures.417  Under the law, 
groups were required to register within fourteen days of exceeding 
the threshold amount.418  Once registered, groups were required to 
file one report annually and five reports during election years 
disclosing the sources of all contributions exceeding $100.419  Failure 
to comply could result in civil and criminal penalties, ranging from 
fines to imprisonment of up to five years.420 
Six of the eleven judges on the Eighth Circuit hearing Swanson 
voted to grant a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the 
law.421  The majority emphasized two points.  First, the majority 
maintained that the law impermissibly distinguished between 
corporations and any other associations and individuals, the latter of 
which were subject to additional burdens when their spending 
exceeded the statutory threshold.422  Second, and more intrinsic to its 
holding, the majority found that the burdens were substantial and 
virtually identical to burdens imposed on PACs.423  Most onerous, in 
the majority’s mind, was the reporting requirement triggered by a 
$100 threshold, which continued until it was dissolved, regardless of 
whether the association continued to make expenditures.424  The court 
found that the government “ha[d] not stated any plausible reason why 
continued reporting from nearly all associations, regardless of the 
association’s major purpose, [wa]s necessary to accomplish [its] 
interests.”425  The court found that the state could accomplish its 
interests through “less problematic measures,” such as requiring 
reporting whenever money is spent.426 
 
 417. See Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 867–68 (8th 
Cir. 2012). 
 418. Id. at 886. 
 419. Id. at 887. 
 420. Id. at 870. 
 421. Id.  The Court found that the lower court “abused its discretion by denying 
their motion for preliminary injunction because [the plaintiff’s] w[ere] likely [to] 
succeed on the merits of their claim that Minnesota’s campaign finance laws 
unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to engage in political speech through 
independent expenditures.” Id. 
 422. Id. at 871. 
 423. Id. at 872. 
 424. Id. at 873. 
 425. Id. at 877 (emphasis omitted). 
 426. Id. at 876–77 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Swanson represents a departure from the more deferential 
approach that other courts take.  Other courts repeatedly have 
upheld laws distinguishing among speakers in the disclosure 
context,427 and the Supreme Court has referenced the prohibition 
against distinguishing amongst speakers only in the context of laws 
prohibiting speech.428 
Moreover, although the monetary thresholds were higher in the 
laws that were upheld by other courts, they all required ongoing 
reporting regardless of the extent of a PAC’s activity until it 
dissolved.  In Sorrell, the court found that the ongoing requirements 
were “reasonable,” even though the committees were required to 
make reports when they were inactive, because such reports “took no 
more than ten to fifteen minutes to complete.”429  The dissolution 
requirements in the law reviewed in Sorrell were arguably more 
burdensome than the requirements in the law in Swanson, which 
merely required checking a box on the front page of the form.430  
Unlike the law struck down in Citizens United, the law in Swanson 
did not require the organizations to speak through a separate 
association nor did it limit who could make donations to the 
organizations.431 
IV.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: PLUGGING HOLES AND 
INCREASING DISCLOSURE 
A. Congress’s Role 
In an era that promotes transparency, Congress should follow the 
approach that several states have taken.  Congress should enact broad 
disclosure requirements that impose PAC-style continuous reporting 
requirements on all individuals and organizations receiving 
contributions or making expenditures over a certain amount in a 
calendar year for the purpose of supporting or defeating a federal 
 
 427. See, e.g., Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2011); Vt. 
Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 376 (D. Vt. 2012). 
 428. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898–99 (2010) 
(citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)). 
 429. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 396. 
 430. Swanson, 692 F.3d at n.4; see id. at 885 (Melloy, J., dissenting) (disagreeing 
with the majority that “fil[ing] a statement of inactivity which comprises a one-page 
form, on which the treasurer can check a box for inactivity” does not impose an 
“undue” burden). 
 431. Id. at 881 (Melloy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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candidate.432  The threshold amount should be set at a level that is 
sufficiently high so that it does not unduly burden small groups with 
limited resources.433 
The federal government can constitutionally require the proposed 
comprehensive disclosure requirements.  Since Citizen’s United, with 
the exception of one circuit, all lower courts have found that the 
major purpose test is not constitutionally mandated.434  In Buckley, 
the Supreme Court read the major purpose test into a provision that 
acted not only as a regulation, but also as a ban on speech by 
restricting the amounts and sources of contributions to PACs.  The 
current PAC requirements serve only to regulate speech, thus 
eliminating the need for the major purpose test.435  This reasoning is 
supported by the Supreme Court’s assertion in Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life that, although the Constitution mandated an 
exemption for an organization from a limit on the use of its general 
treasury funds for campaign-related activity, it did not exempt it from 
more extensive disclosure requirements.436  Moreover, in Citizens 
United, eight Justices rejected an attempt to limit the scope of 
permissible disclosure requirements to its prior interpretation of 
certain provisions of the FECA, thus implying that its prior limiting 
construction of provisions placing limits on speech is not 
constitutionally mandated for mere regulations of speech.437 
By replacing the major purpose test with a monetary trigger, 
Congress would reflect the sentiment of the vast majority of the 
voting public and, at the same time, fulfill the original intent of the 
BCRA by making it harder for organizations intent on circumventing 
the requirements to avoid disclosure.438  The President has supported 
broad disclosure requirements,439 especially in light of the Supreme 
 
 432. See generally supra Part III.B.2. 
 433. Cf. supra notes 400–02 and accompanying text. 
 434. See supra notes 342–47, 393–99 and accompanying text; see also Ctr. for 
Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 484 & n.17 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining 
how, although “Herrera was argued and decided after Citizens United, briefing [was] 
completed prior to the Supreme Court’s decision,” and “[t]he only reference to 
Citizens United was . . . in a footnote” of the court’s opinion).  Moreover, two of the 
laws that were found unconstitutional prior to Citizens United, imposed bans in 
addition to disclosure requirements on non-major purpose organizations. See supra 
notes 334, 338. 
 435. See supra note 344 and accompanying text. 
 436. See supra note 343 and accompanying test. 
 437. See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
 438. See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text. 
 439. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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Court’s decision in Citizens United, which had the effect of green-
lighting the use of campaign money laundering tactics by those 
determined to avoid disclosure.440  In enacting broad disclosure 
requirements, members of Congress would have no reason to fear 
voter backlash, since the vast majority of Americans support 
increased disclosure.441  Congress’s intent when it enacted the BCRA 
was to prevent groups from easily circumventing disclosure 
requirements by omitting Buckley’s magic words, which allowed 
those groups to use obscure names to mislead the public.442  Today, 
organizations just as easily can avoid disclosure as they could before 
the BCRA’s enactment by omitting certain words and references in 
their communications,443 siphoning contributions for general purposes 
only,444 or using their coffers to finance other organizations’ 
campaign-related activities.445 
A monetary trigger would increase predictability by providing 
organizations with clear notice as to when they would be subject to 
continued reporting requirements.  Large organizations frequently 
have many purposes,446 and determining their single major purpose is 
no easy task.447  Moreover, the major purpose of organizations may 
shift over time.448  For example, the major purpose of an organization 
during a federal election campaign could be influencing the election, 
but once the election is over, the major purpose could shift to other 
missions, such as influencing the legislative agendas of members of 
Congress.449  That an organization’s major purpose may shift over 
time should not be the basis for finding that the organization’s major 
purpose is not influencing elections. 
As it stands now, the major purpose test serves as an easy way for 
organizations to thwart disclosure requirements by either increasing 
non-campaign related activities or by merging with organizations that 
 
 440. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 441. See supra note 50, at 9. 
 442. See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text. 
 443. See supra notes 253–58, 278–84, 299–305 and accompanying text. 
 444. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 445. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 446. See supra note 346 
 447. See supra notes 296–314 and accompanying text (discussing the FEC 
Commissioners’ disagreement over how to determine a group’s major purpose). 
 448. See supra note 305. 
 449. See, e.g., Editorial, When Super PACs Become Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
26, 2012, at A30. 
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are not engaged in campaign-related activities.450  The prevalence of 
this circumvention is apparent from the rapid increase in undisclosed 
spending following the Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin II.451  
A monetary trigger would make it more difficult for organizations to 
avoid disclosure by funneling money from non-PAC organizations or 
shell corporations to political committees.452  Even those with the 
resources and determination to avoid disclosure would be less able to 
hide inside the corporate equivalent of matrushka dolls.453 
Furthermore, by doing away with the major purpose test, non-
PACs no longer would be able to avoid disclosure by instructing 
donors who wish to remain undisclosed not to earmark their 
contributions.454  Large organizations involved in non-campaign-
related activity would still be able to establish segregated funds for 
campaign activity if they did not want to disclose all contributions, but 
would not be required to do so.455  As a result, many large 
corporations would be incentivized to create segregated funds, which 
would have the added effect of protecting shareholder interests by 
ensuring that large corporations would not be able to spend 
exorbitant amounts of their general treasury funds on campaign-
related activity that was contrary to their shareholders’ interests.456 
B. The FEC’s Role 
All six members of the FEC should enforce the plain meaning of § 
100.22(b)’s definition of express advocacy.  Enforcement of the plain 
meaning means that the agency must consider, “when taken as a 
whole,” whether the advertisement expressly advocates the election 
or defeat of a federal candidate.457  Section 100.22(b) is not invalid on 
constitutional or statutory grounds, and without it, groups can easily 
evade disclosure by avoiding the use of “magic words,” thereby 
frustrating the intent of the BCRA.458 
 
 450. See supra note 336 and accompanying text. 
 451. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 452. Cf. supra notes 204–08 and accompanying text. 
 453. See supra notes 204–08 and accompanying text. 
 454. Once an organization’s contributions or expenditures were to exceed the 
threshold amount, all donors contributing more than $100 to the organization would 
be disclosed. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 455. See, e.g., supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 456. Cf. supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 457. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (2013). 
 458. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. 
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Section 100.22(b) is not unconstitutional because it extends beyond 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Buckley.  In order to avoid 
facial invalidation of a law, a court is required to consider any limiting 
construction and not the most liberal construction that is permitted 
under the Constitution.459  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation did not foreclose the possibility of subsequent agency 
action.460  This understanding is supported by the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion in McConnell that Buckley’s magic words test was “a 
product of statutory interpretation and not a constitutional 
command.”461  It also helps explain why the Chief Justice’s controlling 
opinion in Wisconsin II rejected the argument that the only 
permissible test for express advocacy is the “magic words” test,462 and 
why the Court has declined to hear challenges to § 100.22(b)’s 
validity.463 
Congress intended the FEC to enforce § 100.22(b) when it enacted 
the BCRA.  The intent of the BCRA was to increase disclosure and 
prevent outside groups from easily circumventing disclosure 
requirements.464  In enacting the BCRA, Congress listened to 
substantial hearings and engaged in extensive debate over proposed 
amendments to many aspects of the FECA.465  Although members of 
Congress expressed concern over the constitutionality of § 100.22(b), 
they did not act to strike it down.466  Congress also did not attempt to 
limit the FEC’s authority to promulgate rules expanding the 
definition of express advocacy.467  That members of Congress were 
aware of § 100.22(b) and the potential constitutional issues 
surrounding it but chose not to amend or repeal it constitutes, at a 
minimum, acquiescence to the FEC’s statutory authority to continue 
to enforce § 100.22(b).468 
When Congress enacted the BCRA, its clear intent was to define 
ECs more expansively than the pre-existing definition of express 
 
 459. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 460. See supra notes 267–68 and accompanying text. 
 461. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 103 (2003). 
 462. See Real Truth About Abortion v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544, 551 
(4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 841 (2013); supra note 243. 
 463. See Real Truth About Abortion v. Fed, Election Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 841 
(2013) (denial of certiorari). 
 464. See supra notes 141–46 and accompanying text. 
 465. See supra note 269. 
 466. See id. 
 467. See supra notes 269–72 and accompanying text. 
 468. Cf. supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
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advocacy.469  Congress clearly was aware that, during the thirty or 
sixty days preceding an election, some communications that would 
otherwise constitute express advocacy could qualify as electioneering 
communications.470  By inserting language in § 434 stating that ECs do 
not constitute independent expenditures, Congress clearly intended 
to convey that ECs were not to be narrowly construed in such a way 
as independent expenditures had been in Buckley.471  To construe the 
language otherwise would lead to the seemingly absurd result that, by 
enacting the BCRA, Congress intended to limit enforcement of 
express advocacy.  Moreover, the filing conundrum can be resolved 
by requiring that all communications within the requisite number of 
days before an election that would otherwise qualify as express 
advocacy be filed as ECs and express advocacy.472 
The FEC should determine whether a communication “refers to a 
clearly identified federal candidate” by looking to the references in 
the context of the communication as a whole.473  In enacting the 
BCRA, Congress intended to provide disclosure requirements that 
would not be easily evaded by avoiding certain words.474  By 
interpreting “clearly identified” statically, the Commissioners are 
ensuring that organizations will have a clearly defined manual for 
evasion, thereby frustrating Congress’s general intent.  The phrase 
“refers to a clearly identified candidate” is not static, but varies 
depending on the timing and the context of the communication as a 
whole.  Moreover, § 100.17 does not use any qualifying language that 
would prohibit consideration of external events.475  What may not be 
an “unambiguous reference” to a candidate six months prior to an 
election may be in the days immediately preceding the election.  
Further, as elections draw nearer, candidates become closely 
associated with issues, such that a reference to those issues, in 
viewers’ minds, may be a reference to the candidates themselves.476 
 
 469. See supra note 144–47 and accompanying text. 
 470. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2013). 
 471. See supra notes 270–71 and accompanying text. 
 472. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 473. See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
 474. See supra notes 141–46 and accompanying text. 
 475. Compare 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (2013), with 11 C.F.R. § 100.17 (2013). 
 476. See Nat’l Def. Comm., Comments on A.O. Request 2012-27, at 2–5 (Fed. 
Election Comm’n Aug. 6, 2012); supra note 261 and accompanying text.  For 
example, a reference to Obamacare would have been meaningless before its usage 
was adopted to mean legislation that was part of the President’s first term agenda. 
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C. The Courts’ Role 
1. The Heightened Specificity Standard Should Not Apply to 
Disclosure Laws 
The “greater degree of specificity” that laws restricting speech 
require should not apply to laws compelling disclosure.  The Supreme 
Court has only applied a heightened specificity standard for 
vagueness in the context of laws that act as a ban on speech.477  Broad 
standards in the context of disclosure laws do not create the same 
vagueness concerns that they do in the context of standards that are 
used to determine when an entity may speak.  A broad standard will 
not have a real and substantial deterrent effect on legitimate 
expression because entities are not faced with determining whether 
speaking would subject them to criminal sanctions, but whether they 
will be penalized for not disclosing information related to their 
speech.478  Thus, the effect is that entities will disclose more than they 
would otherwise have to, not that they will refrain from speaking.  
Organizations concerned with over-disclosure have a variety of means 
by which they can limit disclosure, such as by creating separate 
segregated funds.479 
The Supreme Court’s justifications for applying exacting scrutiny 
instead of strict scrutiny to disclosure laws lends further support to 
this argument.480  Broad laws compelling disclosure do not impose a 
ceiling on campaign-related activities,481 and serve important 
governmental interests, including preventing groups from easily 
circumventing disclosure requirements.482 
2. Courts Should Be Deferential to State Attempts to Discover the 
Extent of Outside Influence in their Local Elections 
With overall spending on state elections generally far more limited 
than spending on federal elections, outside groups spending large 
amounts can have a disproportionate influence on local elections.483  
Arguably, then, states have an even greater interest than the federal 
 
 477. See generally supra Part I.B. 
 478. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 479. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 480. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 481. See id. 
 482. See generally supra Part I.B.1. 
 483. See supra note 325 and accompanying text. 
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government in requiring disclosure of adequate information to enable 
their citizens to assess the extent of outside influence on local 
elections.  Local representatives, too, have recognized the negative 
impact of non-disclosure by voting in favor of increased disclosure, 
often against their own interests and the interests of the special 
interest groups that contribute substantially to their reelection 
campaigns.484  Thus, a state’s ability to implement broad disclosure 
requirements represents a concerted effort on behalf of local 
legislators to meet the needs of their state’s citizenry.485  Recognizing 
both the strong interest of the states486 along with the expertise of 
state legislatures in matters relating to campaign finance and the 
charge of state legislatures to pass laws tailored to address the specific 
needs of their state, courts should be particularly deferential to state 
decisions to compel disclosure.487 
By invalidating pure disclosure laws, courts undermine the notions 
of horizontal federalism and state autonomy.488  States should be free 
to serve as laboratories of experimentation, especially in the context 
of determining the electorate and reducing the influence of outside 
groups on the electorate subject to the bounds of the Constitution.489  
While courts can be inquisitive when states enact disclosure 
requirements that set relatively low monetary thresholds, they should 
still be deferential.490 
CONCLUSION 
The proliferation of undisclosed spending in recent elections has 
resulted in increasing calls for the FEC and Congress to act.  Eighty-
five percent of Americans surveyed desire increased disclosure.  
Although Congress and the FEC may be divided, the nation is not.  
Congress and the FEC should act to increase disclosure to meet the 
public’s demands. 
On the judicial front, although courts have been nearly unanimous 
in upholding state disclosure laws, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Swanson signals that this trend may be reversing.  Without proper 
guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts will be forced to 
 
 484. See supra notes 328–32 and accompanying text. 
 485. See id. 
 486. See id. 
 487. See id. 
 488. See supra note 330 and accompanying text. 
 489. See Patrick M. Garry et al., supra note 325, at 37, and accompanying text. 
 490. See supra note 366 and accompanying text. 
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continue to grapple with a series of confusing and seemingly 
contradictory precedential decisions that offer little guidance 
concerning whether enhanced disclosure is constitutional.  In the 
meantime, lower courts should continue to accord state legislatures 
deference in their decisions to increase disclosure of campaign 
spending in local elections. 
